University of Mississippi

eGrove
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2014

The Role Of Independence In The Effectiveness Of Continuous
Auditing
Dereck D. Barr
University of Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
Barr, Dereck D., "The Role Of Independence In The Effectiveness Of Continuous Auditing" (2014).
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 354.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/354

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CONTINUOUS AUDITING

A Dissertation
presented in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the E. H. Patterson School of Accountancy
The University of Mississippi

by
DERECK D. BARR
May 2014

Copyright Dereck D. Barr 2014
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ABSTRACT

In this study, I examine whether and how the frequency of internal audits (continuous vs.
periodic), functional independence (separate vs. combined internal audit assurance and
consulting functions), and the type of earnings management (accrual-based vs. real) affect
internal auditors’ perception of the likelihood managers will manipulate earnings. I find that
earnings management is less likely when the internal audit function uses continuous auditing,
regardless of the level of independence. However, the effect of independence is contextdependent such that internal auditors expect that real (accrual-based) earnings management is
less likely when the internal audit function is independent (not independent), regardless of audit
frequency. The findings of this study could be of importance to regulators, accounting
researchers, and audit practice.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Research Questions
With the help of the internal audit function (IAF) and other divisions (e.g., accounting,

operations); a significant number of firms have begun to implement continuous auditing (CA) 1
(PwC 2006). While this technology could increase the probability that auditors identify and
report opportunistic behavior, e.g., earnings management, by managers (DeAngelo 1981a),
specific involvement of the IAF during the development phase could present independence2
concerns when the IAF subsequently uses CA in its assurance activities. Considering the IAF’s
dual role as provider of both assurance and consulting services to the firm (Institute of Internal
Auditors (IIA) 2009) and the potential lack of independence when these functions are not
properly segregated (Ahlawat and Lowe 2004), I examine the role that independence plays in the
effectiveness of using CA to mitigate earnings management. 3 The presence (Chi et al. 2011) and
focus of auditors (Burnett et al. 2012) during their evaluation of firm operating efficiency, related
to real earnings management (Roychowdhury 2006); and financial reporting, related to accrual-

1

I define continuous auditing as real-time audits of company data at the transaction level using technology.
In the current study, I specifically focus on the notion of functional alignment of the IAF—such that auditors
performing the assurance and consulting functions are segregated—as a means of increasing independence (Ahlawat
and Lowe 2004).
3
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as managers’ use of “judgment in financial reporting and in
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes (e.g. bonuses) that depend on reported accounting
numbers” (368). Earnings management may be accrual-based (e.g., adjusting accounting estimates) or real (e.g.,
adjusting the timing of operational decisions).
2

1

based earnings management (Prawitt et al. 2009) often dictates how managers decide to
manipulate earnings to achieve a specific earnings target. In particular, various factors such as
size of the IAF, complexity of the firm, and expertise of the IAF (Anderson et al. 2012), dictate
whether and to what extent IAF assurance focuses on one type of earnings management or the
other. Consequently, I also examine whether the type of earnings management (accrual-based
vs. real) affects the role independence plays in the effectiveness of continuous auditing.

1.2

Motivation
Despite practitioners’ and standards setters’ assertions that more frequent audits could

improve the quality of audit evidence (AICPA 2012; Gonzalez et al. 2012), continuous auditing
(CA) research follows the fragmented approach of the broader auditing literature (Knechel et al.
2012, reviews this literature). Though audit quality should consider an assessment of the
probability that an auditor will not only discover a breach in the accounting system, but also
report any breach identified (DeAngelo 1981a, 1981b), the extant literature focuses on either
discovery (e.g., Bedard and Biggs 1991; Krishnan 2003) or on the probability of reporting (e.g.,
Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2007). In this study, I employ a more holistic approach by
examining the joint effects of continuous auditing, surrogate for the probability of discovery, and
functionally separating the IAF into assurance and consulting functions, surrogate for the
probability of reporting, on earnings management.
While auditor independence is a nuanced construct (e.g., Schneider et al. 2006; Christopher
et al. 2009; Knechel and Sharma 2012), the primary focus is typically on the separation of
assurance and consulting activities by the auditor. Because the IAF is often involved in the
development of continuous auditing technology and subsequently uses that technology during its

2

assurance activities, I specifically focus on the notion of functional alignment of the IAF—such
that auditors performing the assurance and consulting functions are segregated—as a means of
increasing independence (Ahlawat and Lowe 2004). On the one hand, the internal audit
standards do not restrict (IIA 2009) and both the IAF and firm management prefer the internal
auditor provide both assurance and consulting activities. The idea is that serving in this dual role
increases the value of the IAF to the firm (Bou-Raad 2000). On the other hand, this functional
separation could help to address a potential social pressure threat from management (Brody and
Lowe 2000), a self-review threat that results from potentially reviewing your own work (Church
and Schneider 1992; Brody and Kaplan 1996), or an economic conflict of interest especially
related to incentive compensation or other benefits from the firm (Dezoort et al. 2001; Schneider
2003) that could affect the likelihood internal auditors report breaches in the accounting system
they identify.
The specific breach in the accounting system that I explore in this study is earnings
management. In general, the implication is that higher quality auditors are associated with lower
levels of earnings management (Watkins et al. 2004) and the prior accounting research
acknowledges two distinct types: accrual-based and real. Recent studies examine the
relationship between the types of earnings management because real earnings management is
harder for outsiders to identify (Schipper 1989; Commerford et al. 2013) and presents greater
long-term costs to stakeholders because it has negative consequences on future cash flows
(Cohen and Zarowin 2010). While managers often prefer real earnings management (Graham et
al. 2005), they generally either trade-off between the two types of earnings management (e.g.,
Cohen et al. 2008) or use the two as substitutes (Zang 2011). Studies examining the effect of
continuous auditing on earnings management, all in the internal audit setting, solely focus on

3

real earnings management (Brown et al. 2007). This is likely because internal auditors generally
perform more operational than financial audits (Gramling et al. 2004). However, internal audit
assurance activities also affect financial reporting components such as financial statement
evaluation (Prawitt et al. 2011; Christ et al. 2011) and accrual-based earnings management
(Prawitt et al. 2009).

1.3

Methodology
This paper reports the results of a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment that manipulates

(1) the frequency of audits (continuous vs. periodic), (2) the level of independence (separate vs.
combined assurance and consulting functions), and (3) the setting (accrual-based vs. real
earnings management). In an internal audit setting, 173 practicing 4 internal auditors assessed the
likelihood managers will adjust earnings to achieve an annual bonus in a hypothetical case
scenario.

1.4

Results
Contrary to Schwartz and Young (2002) but consistent with prior CA literature, I find that

internal auditors expect earnings management to be less likely when the IAF uses continuous
auditing overall and within both the ABM and REM settings. I also find that effect of
independence is context-specific. Specifically, internal auditors expect ABM to be less likely
when the IAF is not independent, consistent with Church and Schneider (1992). Alternatively, in

4

Participants in this study are practicing internal auditors representing a cross-section of large (two Fortune 500
companies), medium (one company), and small (one company) publicly-traded companies domiciled in the United
States; 11 different industries, and all regions of the U.S. Participants were obtained through personal relationships
with prior employers, internal audit colleagues, 13 local chapters of the Institute of Internal Auditors, and the
Association of College and University Auditors.

4

the REM setting, internal auditors expect REM to be less likely when the IAF is independent,
consistent with Plumlee (1985). Finally, I find that overall and within both earnings management
settings, independence does not incrementally affect internal auditors’ assessment of the
likelihood of earnings management incremental to increased audit frequency. I also conduct
several supplemental analyses to rule out alternative explanations for the primary findings.

1.5

Contributions
This study complements and builds on prior research in several ways. First, contrary to prior

experimental auditing research, I focus on how joint effects of the probability of discovering
(increased audit frequency) and the probability of reporting (auditor independence) affect the two
general types of earnings management (as in prior archival research) rather than examining the
strategic interaction between the auditor and the manager. Taken together, the findings of the
current study suggest that more frequent audits help to deter earnings management, but
increasing auditor independence differentially affects each type of earnings management. These
findings are consistent with both anecdotal and empirical research on the IAF. Real earnings
management involves the timing and or magnitude of operating decisions while accrual-based
earnings management involves judgment related to choosing an accounting method to reach a
desired level of earnings. However, ABM is easier for an outsider to identify, usually within
generally accepted accounting principles, and is relatively transparent in the year of the change
(Francis et al. 2005). Because the IAF typically has a fundamental knowledge of firm
operations—based on repeated interactions with management and observations of operations—it
is plausible this knowledge is sufficient to mitigate concerns that the IAF may not report real
earnings management, regardless of frequency of audits and the separation (or lack thereof) of

5

the assurance and consulting functions. Alternatively, it is plausible that independence is less
important in an internal auditor’s assessment of the likelihood of accrual-based earnings
management. Depending upon factors such as the size and quality of the IAF and the industry of
the firm (Prawitt et al. 2009), increased audit frequency could improve the likelihood the IAF
detects accrual-based earnings management. However, even though the IAF is considered an
industry specialist and a firm insider (Francis 2004), it is plausible that as compared to
operational knowledge of the firm, the auditor previously serving in a consulting role in the
development of continuous auditing (CA) is essential in this setting.
Furthermore, though increasing numbers of internal audit functions (IAF) plan to implement
CA in the near future, the likely impact of this audit practice on the auditor’s ability to constrain
management behavior is unclear. The extant literature examining CA is primarily in the
accounting information systems domain (see Brown et al. 2007); however, only recently have
studies emerged in auditing research. In addition, this paper contributes to the debate over the
cost versus benefits tradeoff in implementing continuous auditing (Handscombe 2012).
Finally, although this study focuses on the IAF, there are implications for external auditors
and accounting standard setters (Vasarhelyi et al. 2010), who both have an interest in continuous
auditing. For example, to assist in the transition to CA and to improve audit efficiency, the
AICPA has developed several white papers that provide guidance on the importance of CA and
how both internal and external auditors can leverage existing technology to automate the
components of the audit process, e.g. inventory counts (Zhang et al. 2012). The current study
provides experimental evidence related to specific conditions where CA is most effective.
However, as noted by the AICPA (2012), use of CA by the external auditor may require
modification of auditing standards by the PCAOB that will allow a shift of tasks away from

6

traditional manual sampling and testing and change the definition of what constitutes impaired
independence.

1.6

Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents a review of the

literature and develops the hypotheses. Section III provides a summary of the experimental
approach, while Section IV discusses the associated findings. Section V provides conclusions
and implications for future research.

7

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Earnings Management
Detecting and deterring earnings management is an important objective of audit practice,

and the prior accounting research acknowledges two distinct types. In this section, I discuss the
definitions of and relationship between accrual-based and real earnings management. Prior
archival studies operationalize each type of earnings management in various ways. However,
each rely wholly or in part on the fundamental definitions provided by Healy and Wahlen (1999).
I use these definitions to develop my dependent measures. I also review the strategic manner in
which managers use the two forms of earnings management, which has been of interest to
researchers and corporate stakeholders (Commerford et al. 2013).
2.1.1 Definitions of Earnings Management
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as managers’ use of “judgment in
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence
contractual outcomes (e.g. bonuses) that depend on reported accounting numbers” (368). They
also describe two forms of earnings management. The first form involves choosing an
accounting method that results in desired levels of earnings, referred to as accrual-based
earnings management (ABM), and the second involves the timing and/or magnitude of operating
decisions to reach desired earnings, referred to as real earnings management (REM)

8

(Francis et al. 2005). The former is relatively transparent in the year of the change and is
typically the focus of the external auditor and regulators (Brown and Pinello 2007). The latter,
which contributes to operating decisions and ultimately affects future cash flows, is harder for an
outsider (e.g., the external auditor) to identify (Schipper 1989).
Prior research focuses heavily on detecting whether and when earnings management
takes place. This prior research generally falls into two categories: broad measures of earnings
management (i.e., measures based on total accruals) and samples of firms suspected to have
motivation to manage earnings. On the whole, these studies find evidence that firms manage
earnings to “window-dress financial statements” for several reasons including upcoming public
securities’ offerings (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin 2010), the effect earnings have on managers’
compensation (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2010) and the fact that the level of earnings in part
affects managers’ job security (e.g., Francis et al. 2005).
2.1.2 Accrual-Based Earnings Management (ABM)
One method of managing earnings to temporarily boost or reduce income is manipulation
of accruals (e.g. allowance for doubtful accounts). Accruals are components of earnings
distinguishable from real activities manipulation in that they do not directly affect current cash
flows but their construction requires a great deal of managerial discretion (Public Companies
Accounting and Oversight Board (PCAOB) 2011). Accounting research provides evidence that
accounting accruals are related to management’s incentives (e.g., Healy 1985; Jones 1991).
Prior earnings management studies also infer that the use of accruals reflects opportunistic
behavior by mangers to achieve specific short-term earnings targets, for example from analysts
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; DeAngelo 1988). Archival studies examine this opportunistic
financial reporting by examining whether earnings or accruals differ from expectation in a

9

manner favored by managers’ incentives (see Francis et al. 2005, for a review). These studies
demonstrate apparent earnings management; however, the conclusions are often criticized
because of methodological difficulties (e.g. poor incentive proxies, omitted correlated variables
(Libby et al. 2002)). These studies also use data from post-audited financial statements. This data
represents the output of negotiations between managers and auditors—making it difficult to
distinguish manager vs. auditor contributions and whose reporting incentives prevailed (Nelson
et al. 2002). Experimental studies address these criticisms by holding contextual and firm
variables constant and by manipulating incentives and assessing treatment effects rather than
attempting to measure unexpected accruals. These studies also allow the researcher to clearly
examine manager and auditor incentives before annual audits take place (Libby et al. 2002). In
this study, I take the latter approach.
2.1.3 Real Earnings Management
An alternative method of managing earnings to temporarily boost or reduce income is
manipulation of real activities (e.g., research and development, overproduction to lower cost of
goods sold, price discounts to increase sales). Real earnings management (REM) is a relatively
new research area but not new in practice. Arguably, REM imposes greater long-term costs on
the firm and its shareholders than ABM because it has negative consequences on future cash
flows – which has implications on long-term firm value (Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Earlier
literature reviews of earnings management include general discussions of what REM means and
how it may exist (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Schipper 1989) but the REM literature generally
begins with Roychowdhury (2006). Like archival studies of ABM, REM studies are subject to
similar criticisms related to factors such as poor incentive proxies and omitted correlated
variables. Only recently, however, have experimental studies examining REM emerged (e.g.
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Hunton et al. 2008).

2.1.4 Relationship Between Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management
Accounting research reflects the external audit focus on ABM (e.g., Chen et al. 2010;
Prawitt et al. 2009). These studies suggest that presence (Brown and Pinello 2007), quality (Chen
et al. 2011), and or industry-specialization (Bedard and Biggs 1991) of the external auditor is
associated with lower levels of accrual-based earnings management. In practice, while it is clear
that earnings management exists, there is also evidence that managers prefer REM (which could
have negative long-term consequences) (Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006) over ABM
(which is within-GAAP accounting choices). Factors such as the effectiveness of corporate
governance (e.g., internal and or external audit quality) and regulatory scrutiny (Brown and
Pinello 2007; Prawitt et al. 2009) also affect how managers chose to report earnings. However,
less is known about auditors’ perception of and response to management’s use of REM when
they become aware of it (Commerford et al. 2013).
Recent archival studies examine the relationship between ABM and REM and propose
that managers trade-off between the two forms of earnings management in various contexts
(Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Geiger and Rama 2006), such as after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (Cohen et al. 2008), after issuance of seasoned equity offerings (Cohen and Zarowin
2010), or in the presence of high quality external auditors (e.g., Chi et al. 2011; Burnett et al.
2012). Managers may also use the two forms of earnings management as substitutes throughout
the year Zang (2011). To my knowledge, no experimental studies examining this relationship
current exist.

11

2.2

Audit Quality
While not the primary focus of the current study, I discuss audit quality as a theoretical

framework from which I derive my two primary variables of interest – continuous auditing and
internal auditor independence. A comprehensive view of the audit process (See Figure A) should
consider not only the likelihood that the auditor will detect any breaches in the accounting
system (e.g., earnings management) but also the likelihood the auditor will report what he or she
identifies (DeAngelo 1981a, 1981b). While prior auditing research extensively examines the
notion of audit quality in an earnings management context, it does so using a fragmented
approach (see e.g., Watkins et al. 2004; Knechel et al. 2012) focusing on either the probability of
discovery or on the probability of reporting as a proxy for the broader construct of audit quality.
In the current study, I examine both the probability that an internal auditor will discover and
report instances of opportunistic behavior (e.g., earnings management). The result is a more
comprehensive view of auditing.
Figure A: Theoretical Framework
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In Section 2.3, I discuss continuous auditing from a historical, theoretical, and practical
perspective. In Section 2.4, I discuss independence and discuss the theoretical interaction
between continuous auditing and independence in Section 2.5.

2.3

Continuous Auditing (CA)
Most corporations have a significant and growing number of electronically generated and

processed transactions (PwC 2006). Initially performed at AT&T Corporation during the late
1980s (Vasarhelyi and Halper 1991), CA is one response to better analysis, control, and accuracy
of internal and external reporting based on those electronically generated transactions (Teeter
and Brennan 2010). In addition, the age of big data makes the the incremental cost of verifying
more transactions relatively small, especially since most CA procedures are automated (Alles et
al. 2002).
Currently used more so by the internal audit function (IAF), CA allows the auditor to
efficiently and effectively respond to management’s desire for greater assurance in this
environment. A 2000 survey of internal auditors in several countries indicated nearly one-half
the 364 respondents use some form of continuous monitoring software 5. Respondents listed fraud
detection, control self-assessment, and locating duplicate transactions among the most popular
uses (Glover et al. 2000, p. 6). In addition, PricewaterhouseCoopers’ State of the Internal Audit
Profession Study found that more chief audit executives 6 pursue CA as a means to 1) shorten
audit cycles and 2) respond more timely to changes in risk and control (PwC 2006). However,

5

In the 1998 survey of the same population, that trend was only 24%. The report also indicated 10-20% of
respondents use an internally created software for some tasks – presenting a need for more customizable software
tools (Glover et al. 2000, p. 6).
6
A term used to identify the top internal auditor in a company. This position is analogous to partner in an external
audit firm and generally has officer status within the company.
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actual implementation of CA often falls short in comparison to perceived widespread acceptance
and desire for implementation for various reasons including firms’ perceptions of the ease of use,
availability of technological resources, and managerial support (Gonzalez et al. 2012). To that
end, this study offers both practitioners and researchers additional settings where CA could be
more effective.
External stakeholders, such as audit practitioners and standards setters, assert that more
frequent audits could increase the likelihood that an auditor discovers opportunistic behavior by
management throughout the year rather than at year-end (AICPA 2012). For example, the
AICPA Assurance Services Executive Committee’s Emerging Assurance Technologies Task
Force recently updated the Wood Report (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA)
1999) and will create a series of white papers to offer insights into best practices and challenges
related to continuous auditing (AICPA 2012). The Committee is also charged with creating data
standards that will assist external auditors and other IAFs in transitioning to continuous auditing
(Zhang et al. 2012). One of the barriers identified in the report is the potential need for revision
of PCAOB auditing standards that will allow both the financial reporting and the assurance
(auditing) models to 1) be more in line with the technological advances in business, in general
and 2) shift from the current historical view to one this is more real time (e.g., continuous
auditing). The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, for example, recognizes this need
and provided a written response to PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 34: Concept Release
on Possible Revisions to PCAOB Standards Related to Reports on Audited Financial Statements
and included a white paper7 that highlights how auditors in Australia have been able to

7

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia elicited the assistance of the Rutgers Continuous Auditing and
Reporting Lab at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in the development of their white paper titled
Continuous Assurance for the Now Economy (Vasarhelyi et al. 2010).
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revolutionize the audit process using technology and the associated benefits (Vasarhelyi et al.
2010). Further, within the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway
Commission—a joint initiative of the American Accounting Association, AICPA, Financial
Executives International, Institute of Management Accountants, and the IIA—framework for
internal control are following components: the control environment, risk assessment, control
activities, information and communication, and monitoring. COSO endorses and recommends
CA as a means to ensure a firm properly monitors its internal control and enterprise risk
environments. COSO asserts that when implemented and functioning properly, CA can enhance
the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire internal control system (COSO 2009, 2013).
2.3.1 Continuous Auditing and the Audit Process
Use of CA by the IAF continues to rise while use by external auditors has not noticeably
increased. One reason for this lag is because many firms are protective of their data and,
therefore, reluctant or unwilling to allow comprehensive and ongoing access to systems by
outside parties, including external auditors. This ongoing access also presents potential
independence issues for both the IAF and the external auditor (AICPA 2012). Internal Auditors
typically have more flexibility in audit time budgets (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010). However, the
audit universe8 often exceeds the available audit hours. Essentially, the combination of firm size
and IAF personnel determine how much of the auditable units the IAF can review in any
particular year. As a result, many of a company’s functional areas may receive audits once per
year or even as infrequently as once every five years. Despite these limitations on internal
auditors, both intensity in regulatory pressure and increasing corporate complexity warrant more
and more timely assurance (Warren Jr. and Smith 2006).

8

For this study, the audit universe defines the scope of corporate operations, information systems, financial
processes and controls, etc. expressly identified in the internal audit charter as available for audit.
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2.3.2 Hypothesis Development
Prior research examining whether auditors’ use of CA helps to deter earnings
management is both limited and inconclusive9. On one hand, this research suggests that CA helps
to constrain earnings management (Brown et al. 2007). On the other hand, the literature suggests
that periodic auditing is more effective10 (Schwartz and Young 2002). This prior research11
employs a fragmented approach in that it focuses on the strategic interaction between the auditor
and the manager’s incentives and how that interaction affects the manager’s decision to or not to
manage earnings. This research finds that the potential audit efficiencies achieved by CA could
have both functional and dysfunctional behavioral impacts on managers’ decisions.
In the current study, I build on and reconcile this prior research by examining the role the
internal audit function (IAF)—one of the other cornerstones of the corporate governance
framework (Cohen et al. 2004; Gramling et al. 2004)—plays in mitigating both accrual-based
and real earnings management. I also examine two factors associated with the auditor (audit

9

Prior research on CA largely focuses on the importance of CA and discusses hypothetically (or postimplementation) how businesses can use CA to become more efficient, or summarizes the literature on one or more
of those topics (Rezaee et al. 2002; Brown et al. 2007; Hunton and Rose 2010)9. A considerable amount of audit
literature does, however, assess the use of information technology by auditors and the effect of IT on auditors’
judgments (e.g. Messier 1995; O'Donnell and David 2000; Dowling and Leech 2007) and auditors’ perceptions of
need for technology in the audit process (e.g. Fischer 1996; Janvrin et al. 2008; Vasarhelyi et al. n.d.). Only one
study (Hunton et al. 2008) specifically examines the audit-related effects of CA on managers.
10
Schwartz and Young (2002) examine the interactive effect of frequency of interaction (continuous/random
matching of auditors and managers) and verification (absent/present) on managers’ truthful reporting of private
information in an intra-firm (analog to internal auditing), multi-period setting. They find that verification and
continuous matching each increased the relative frequency of honest reporting by managers. However, the
interaction was only significant in the first of forty rounds. They argue that once managers form a reputation, that
reputation affects how the auditor perceives the manager in the future and provides no additional audit efficiency.
11
Hunton et al. (2008), the lone experimental study examining CA and earnings management, examine the extent to
which continuous monitoring interacts with long-term and short-term performance-contingent incentive horizons to
yield potential functional and dysfunctional effects on managers’ willingness to use REM to achieve an earnings
target. Seventy-two corporate managers participate in a between-subjects experiment that manipulates monitoring
frequency (CA vs. periodic auditing) and incentive horizon (long vs. short). The authors measure REM in two ways:
1) managers’ willingness to change quality control expenditures and 2) managers’ willingness to continue or
discontinue a hypothetical project. Three important findings emerge from this study. First, as predicted the authors
find a negative relationship between REM and CA when the manager is motivated by short-term incentives, which
is a functional result of implementing CA.
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frequency and independence) rather than focus on the strategic interaction between the auditor
and manager.
As previously mentioned, DeAngelo (1981a, 1981b) indicates more competent auditors
(operationalized in this study as performing more frequent audits) provide higher quality
assurance. While no prior studies have examined the effect of CA on ABM, internal audit
assurance activities have been shown to mitigate ABM (Prawitt et al. 2009) and other financial
reporting components such as financial statement evaluation (Prawitt et al. 2011). In addition,
use of the IAF as a management training ground (Christ et al. 2011) is associated with measures
of ABM. Specifically, Prawitt et al. (2009) find that higher quality IAF are associated with lower
levels of ABM. While no prior studies have examined the relationship between CA and ABM,
there is some evidence that CA decreases the likelihood of REM 12. One distinct advantage the
IAF has over the external auditor is significant institutional knowledge, garnered through more
operational than financial type assurance activities (associated with REM), of the firm. Because
the IAF generally performs more and arguably more effective operational audits (Christ et al.
2011), it is plausible that there could be differential effects of CA in the deterrence of accrualbased vs. real earnings management.
To the degree that management perceives the frequency of internal audits as a deterrent,
opportunistic behavior (e.g., earnings management) should decline. This suggests the following
hypotheses stated in the null form. Ceteris paribus,
H1:

There is no difference in continuous, relative to periodic, auditing in deterring
earnings management.

H1a: There is no difference in continuous, relative to periodic, auditing in deterring
accrual-based earnings management.
12

The authors use the term continuous monitoring; however, they focus on the IAF’s use of CA and how that affects
managerial decisions rather than on management’s use of the automated software to monitor their division’s actions.
This is an example of the need for clarity between CA and continuous monitoring.
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H1b: Continuous, relative to periodic, auditing is more effective in deterring real
earnings management.
2.4

Auditor Independence
As the cornerstone within the corporate governance framework with direct links to the

other three13, an independent14 internal audit function (IAF) is critical (Salterio 1994). While the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) precludes external auditors from providing both assurance and
consulting to their public clients for perceived lack of independence, internal audit standards
highlight the added value that providing both to the firm offer (IIA 2013).
In the current study, I predict that a separation between auditors who provide consulting
and assurance activities increases the perception of independence (Ahlawat and Lowe 2004)15. In
so doing, I acknowledge that providing both assurance and consulting services could differ when
considering the internal vs. the external audit setting (e.g., Schneider et al. 2006; Christopher et
al. 2009; Knechel and Sharma 2012). One concern that drives regulators to insist upon restricting
the external auditor from providing both consulting and assurance to their audit clients is the
notion that providing both increases their economic bond (Ashbaugh et al. 2003). This suggests
that the additional revenue from the non-audit (consulting) services could decrease the auditor’s

13

The primary components of the corporate governance framework include the audit committee, senior
management, the internal audit function (IAF), and the external auditor (Gramling et al. 2004). Relationships
between and among these components are critical to the successful implementation and maintenance of internal
controls over operations and financial reporting. It is important to examine how the IAF contributes to corporate
governance because it, unlike the external auditor, uniquely serves as a direct resource within the framework.
14
Because independence is a nuanced construct, I specifically define it in this study as the functional separation
between the assurance and consulting activities within the IAF.
15
Ahlawat and Lowe (2004) examine whether outsourcing the IAF affects the independence (and objectivity) of the
internal auditor using an experiment. They provide a corporate acquisition scenario to 35 in-house (e.g., work for
various publicly-traded companies) and 31 outsourced (e.g., work for a Big 4 accounting firm) internal auditors
(recruited through a local chapter of the IIA). Participants were randomly assigned the role of internal auditor for
either the buyer or the seller in a hypothetical acquisition of a target division. The authors measure advocacy in two
ways, participants’ assessment of 1) the likelihood of inventory obsolescence and 2) likelihood of inventory writedown. The results indicate that significant advocacy existed in the judgments of both in-house and outsourced
internal auditors. However, the extent of advocacy was less severe in the case of outsource auditors. These findings
appear to reinforce the supposition that independence in practice is essentially a myth (Morgan 1988).
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willingness to report audit findings to management.
The internal audit setting presents a unique situation. By definition, the IAF is expected to
be an assurance and a consulting activity, e.g., advisory and related client service activities. Both
managers and internal audit standards suggest that this dual role adds value to the firm in the
areas of corporate governance, risk management, and internal control (IIA 2009, 2013).
However, serving in this dual role could present threats to auditor independence such as a social
pressure threat, from management; an economic interest threat, especially if incentive
compensation or other benefits are received from the firm; or a self-review threat, auditor
potentially reviewing their own work (Stewart and Subramaniam 2010)16.
First, the social pressure threat suggests that since the internal auditor works for the firm he
or she also audits, there could be pressure to side with management (e.g., Brody and Lowe 2000;
Ahlawat and Lowe 2004) when there is no clear delineation between the consulting and
assurance activities of the IAF. Second, the threat of economic-related conflicts of interest
suggests when the internal auditor receives incentive compensation or other benefits from the
firm, and the receipt of those incentives are based on firm performance (Dezoort et al. 2001) and
or internal audit activity (Schneider 2003), that compensation could affect the likelihood internal
auditors report breaches in the accounting system they identify. Finally, the self-review threat
specifically applies to the setting in this study. This threat suggests when the internal auditor
consults with management on a particular project, like the development of continuous auditing,
then subsequently either audits or uses the output of the project, independence is impaired. The
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Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) reference several mitigating factors noted in prior literature that can act as
safeguards against these perceived threats to independence. Those factors include organizational position and
corporate policy statements which “increase the status of internal auditors in the organization, a strong and
supportive governance environment, appropriate incentive schemes which reward objectivity, the use of teams, and
adequate supervision of staff” (332).

19

audit literature is inconclusive on the implications of this threat. On one hand, the literature
suggests that independence, and the related concept of objectivity, is impaired when they have
prior involvement in the design of internal controls related to a particular project (Plumlee 1985;
Brody and Kaplan 1996)17 like the development of continuous auditing. On the other hand, the
literature suggests prior involvement is not a significant determinant of future ability to be
independent (Church and Schneider 1992).
2.4.1 Hypothesis Development
In the current study, I build on the prior research by investigating a setting where internal
auditors’ independence could be impaired. I argue that functionally aligning the IAF such that
internal auditors conduct either assurance or consulting activities results in greater independence
(Ahlawat and Lowe 2004). This alignment allows auditors to focus on their specific role, to
approach either the consulting or assurance activity objectively, and could specifically mitigate
the social pressure and self-review threats. While I hold compensation constant in this study, this
alignment does not address the potential for economic-related conflicts of interest because the
IAF as a whole, regardless of the function role, would be eligible for any incentive compensation
(Dezoort et al. 2001).
I also examine the differential effects of independence on accrual-based vs. real earnings
management. No prior research provides theoretical predictions on any differential effects. As
previously indicated in the discussion of audit frequency, internal auditors typically perform
more operational (related to real earnings management) than financial audits (Gramling et al.
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In an internal control review task, Plumlee (1985) finds when an internal auditor reviewed controls he previously
designed perceived those controls to be stronger (and malfunctions less severe) than an internal auditor who had no
involvement in the design phase. Brody and Kaplan (1996) and Brody and Lowe (2000) find similar results in a
budgeting and an acquisition setting, respectively. On the other hand, Church and Schneider (1992) find opposite
results in a task similar to Plumlee (1985). Their results suggest prior involvement is not a significant determinant of
future ability to be independent and objective when reviewing an internal auditor’s own prior work.
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2004). During these audits, auditors develop independent knowledge of the firm and its
processes that make them sufficiently qualified to make and assess decisions in that context. This
independent knowledge also suggests that independence is less important in the real earnings
management setting. Alternatively, while the IAF does have an effect on financial reporting and
financial statement evaluation (Prawitt et al. 2011; Christ et al. 2011) and the knowledge of the
operations of the firm is also critical, internal auditors are generally 18 less knowledgeable in this
area and would need to rely on management more during assurance activities. Functional
alignment is likely more critical in the ABM setting. This suggests the following hypotheses.
Ceteris paribus,

2.5

H2:

Earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the IAF has separate
(combined) assurance and consulting functions.

H2a:

Accrual-based earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the IAF
has separate (combined) assurance and consulting functions.

H2b:

Real earnings management will be no different when the IAF has separate vs.
combined assurance and consulting functions.

Audit Frequency and Independence
In this study, I extend theory related to continuous auditing (CA) by examining whether

and to what extent internal auditor independence incrementally improves the effectiveness of CA
in deterring earnings management. Prior research on CA calls for studies examining the
effectiveness of CA in new contexts (Brown et al. 2007). I answer this call and subsequently add
to the literature by examining specific qualities of the internal audit function, audit frequency and
auditor independence, rather than the strategic interaction between the one quality of the auditor
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Factors such as the size, industry, certifications, and management preferences could affect the amount of
operational vs. financial assurance the IAF performs (Anderson et al. 2012). The argument here is that the more
familiar the auditor is in a specific setting, it is less important if they are functionally independent within the IAF.
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(audit frequency) and the manager (e.g., bonus incentive horizon). Continuous auditing
technology is often developed internally, where the IAF serves as a consultant on a corporatewide development team that includes divisions such as information technology, accounting, and
operations (Handscombe 2012). The resulting technology is available for use by both the IAF (to
assist in its assurance activities) and management (to facilitate its internal control monitoring
role). This naturally occurring setting is ideal to test the interaction between audit frequency and
independence.
2.5.1 Hypotheses Related to the Interaction of CA and Independence
I predict that the likelihood of earnings management will decrease in a setting where the
IAF uses continuous auditing and has separate assurance and consulting functions. As previously
discussed, more frequent audits increase the number of interactions auditors have with managers
and subsequently the likelihood of detecting earnings management (DeAngelo 1981a). I argue
that functional alignment of the IAF, when the CA technology has been developed in-house,
incrementally improves the effectiveness of CA for at least two reasons. First, the auditor is
likely to be more critical of the technology prior to use and will be more critical in the
assessment of internal controls within the technology (Plumlee 1985). Second, as a provider of
only assurance, the auditor generally has a different relationship with managers. The goal of
assurance is to critically review a particular division or process, whereas, the goal of consulting
is to advocate for and help to improve (specifically the internal controls) a particular division or
process (Brody and Lowe 2000). Alternatively, I predict that the likelihood of earnings
management will increase in a setting where the IAF uses continuous auditing and has combined
assurance and consulting functions. This setting differs in that it incites cognitive dissonance in
the mind of the auditor as he or she attempts to detach the consulting from the advocacy role,
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when performing one role or the other. Prior research demonstrates that in this particular setting,
traditional periodic auditing is more effective, regardless of functional alignment of the IAF
(Schwartz and Young 2002). Furthermore, I predict that the likelihood of ABM and REM will
decrease (increase) in a setting where the IAF uses continuous auditing and has separate
(combined) assurance and consulting functions. I expect that CA alone will decrease the
likelihood of earnings management and the consideration of independence, as previously
described, increases the effectiveness of continuous auditing. This suggests the following
hypotheses. Ceteris paribus,
H3:

Earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the IAF uses continuous
auditing and has separate assurance and consulting functions.

H3a: Accrual-based earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the IAF
uses continuous auditing and has separate assurance and consulting functions.
H3b: Real earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the IAF uses
continuous auditing and has separate assurance and consulting functions.

2.6

Summary
This chapter reviews and defines the variables examined in this study. In the context of

this study, I specifically discuss continuous auditing, accrual-based and real earnings
management, and independence. For each variable, I provide a contextual definition for this
study, a historical background (where applicable), and review literature that guides both
academic thought and practice and that help develop the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

I differentiate this study from prior research by examining two factors related to the
internal audit function (IAF)—frequency of audits and independence—rather than the interaction
between the IAF and managers’ incentives. In addition, I separately measure accrual-based
(ABM) and real (REM) earnings management to assess the effectiveness of continuous auditing
(CA) in deterring earnings management in general and in both its forms. I elicit practicing
internal auditors’ assessments of the likelihood that managers will use ABM or REM to achieve a
specific earnings target that, if met, results in the manager receiving an annual bonus. Although
managers are better able to predict their responses to the hypothetical case, management’s
experience is limited to their own prior experience both with earnings manipulation and with the
IAF. In addition, while external auditors do not currently use continuous auditing, some chief
financial officers argue that the “rules-orientation of the FASB” has negatively affected the
external audit profession such that local offices have less room to exercise discretion in their
interactions with the audit client (Dichev et al. 2013; Nelson and Skinner 2013). Consequently, I
ask auditors, rather than managers, to participate in the study for several other reasons that
include: (1) internal auditors are in the best position to estimate how they would respond (e.g.,
how CA impacts the effectiveness of their audits) and have the second-best knowledge of overall
firm management’s response to IAF practices; (2) managers may not respond truthfully in
estimating their behavior related to a practice that internal and external stakeholders may deem
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unethical, though it is often legal; (3) internal auditors do not have management’s direct
incentives to bias their responses (Libby and Kinney 2000); and (4) internal auditors are not
bound by the perceived restrictions of accounting and auditing standards.
The experimental instrument was developed based on prior research (e.g., Hirst 1994;
Ahlawat and Lowe 2004), interviews with two chief audit executives of IAFs for publicly-traded
companies, and several internal auditors at the manager level. The final instrument was
examined by three additional chief audit executives for relevance and clarity. In addition, the
instrument was pilot tested by three accounting faculty and 10 accounting Ph.D. students. Their
helpful comments resulted in wording changes that better express the instructions, both
experimental manipulations, and the dependent measures. After the modifications from the initial
pilot test, 40 masters of accountancy students enrolled in an Internal/Operational Auditing course
during the fall of 2013 participated in a second pilot test. Analysis of the data collected and
feedback from participants resulted in minor wording changes and adjustments to the flow of the
experiment and the manipulation checks.

3.1

Description of the Instrument and Experimental Tasks (The Case)
I adapt the case in this study from prior research (e.g, Hirst 1994; Libby and Kinney

2000). Participants learn that the primary financial goal of a hypothetical firm (Pulliam
Manufacturing) is to increase profitability of dollars invested (See Appendix 1). I measure
profitability at the division level and as return on investment (ROI). Managers receive an annual
bonus when their division’s ROI exceeds the company’s cost of capital (fixed at 12%). Pulliam
Manufacturing reduces a manager’s divisional ROI for any significant internal audit findings
reported to senior management.
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The case first presents background information about the company, how the IAF assigns
auditors to assurance and consulting engagements (the independence manipulation), and the
audit methodology (the audit frequency manipulation). Next, the case presents, the division’s
ROI for the first half of the fiscal year (which is currently below the cost of capital at 10%) and
the ROI projection for the full year (11%) if the manager does not manipulate the underlying
accounting information for his/her division. Finally, the case presents options, randomly assigned
as either accrual-based or real earnings management, the manager could undertake to slightly
exceed the cost of capital to receive the bonus. Participants are made aware that if the manager
chooses to manage earnings, it will be reflected in the next internal audit 19 as a variance from the
budgeted and prior year amounts, require follow-up, and result in a reduction in divisional ROI.

3.2

Variable Definitions

3.2.1 Independent Variables
3.2.1.1 Continuous Auditing (IAFreq)
I manipulate audit frequency (IAFreq) at two levels between-subjects [continuous] vs.
(periodic) to specifically test H1 and H3. I operationalize audit frequency as follows:
When the internal audit department performs assurance engagements, it does so on a
[continuous basis using automated software] (rotating basis) such that divisions are
audited [continuously] (once every three years). Any significant variances and control
exceptions are reported [continuously] (whenever the audit is complete) to all
divisional and senior management. The last audit of this division was [yesterday] (last
year) and there were no significant findings.
I pattern the audit frequencies after the traditional and continuous auditing (e.g., Coderre et al.
2005) practices currently used by the IAF to measure the occurrence and timing of audits. The

19

The audit frequency is daily in the continuous audit condition and every three years in the periodic auditing
setting, which suggests the auditor may not identify the earnings management for another two years.
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continuous auditing condition emphasizes the transactions-based audit with alerts when real-time
transactions violate the pre-established controls. It also highlights the fact that senior
management receives more timely reports from the IAF. In the periodic auditing condition, the
hypothetical IAF reviews the same information, however, there exists a more significant delay in
relaying any exceptions noted to senior management. I also indicate the previous audit of the
division was the previous day (year), and there were no significant findings to ensure that
participants focus on the upcoming audit, which could be either the next day or in two years.
This design reinforces the continuous nature of more frequents audits designed to help deter
opportunistic behavior by managers (see Appendix 2).
3.2.1.2 Independence (Indep)
I manipulate auditor independence (Indep) at two levels between-subjects, [separate] vs.
(combined) consulting and assurance functions, to test H2 and H3. I operationalize
independence as follows:
Your department has [separate] (combined) assurance (e.g. audits) and consulting (e.g.
special projects like developing new software) functions.
I operationalize independence as a separation between consulting and assurance functions for
two reasons. First, while all management teams represent the IAF, functional alignment of roles
(Ahlawat and Lowe 2004) in this study addresses the findings in prior studies that continuous
verification by the same auditor limits the effectiveness of the audit (Schwartz and Young 2002).
Second, one of the primary differences between internal and external auditors is the perceived
potential for economic bonding—resulting in a lack of independence (Ashbaugh et al. 2003).
Internal auditors are, in principle, economically bonded to the company for which they provide
assurance and consulting service because the company employs them and may also pay incentive
compensation (Dezoort et al. 2001). Rather than focus solely on the economic bond, I also
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consider how serving in this dual role could present other threats to auditor independence such as
a social pressure threat, from management; or a self-review threat, as the auditor could
potentially review his or her own work (Stewart and Subramaniam 2010). Both IIA standards
and internal audit research suggest the IAF can increase independence related to this duality of
roles as provider of assurance and consulting services by functionally separating auditors who
perform consulting (e.g. in the development of CA) and assurance (e.g. auditing using the CA
technology) engagements within the IAF.
3.2.1.3 Dependent Variables
Participants assess the likelihood that a manager working for Pulliam Manufacturing
would adjust accounting data using either a measure of accrual-based (ABM) (81 participants) or
real (REM) (92 participants) earnings management for the second half of 2013 using a 10-point
Likert-type scale (ranging from Very Unlikely to Very Likely).
In the ABM setting, participants assess whether managers would decrease the current
estimate of bad debts expense by lowering the estimated uncollectible percentage on accounts
receivable over 90-days due from 50 to 25 percent. To emphasize the amount of judgment
required in ABM, participants also learn that collection patterns for prior years are inconclusive
as support for the reduction in the allowance percentage. Participants see the following
explanation for this option in the experimental materials.
To increase the division’s budgeted annual ROI above the 12% cost of capital, the
manager could reduce bad debt expense for the second half of FY13. By reducing the
allowance for uncollectible accounts percentage for accounts over 90-days due from 50%
to 25% the division will significantly decrease the bad debt expense. Collection patterns
for prior years are inconclusive as support for the reduction in the allowance percentage.
In the REM setting, participants assess whether managers would decrease quality control
expenditures. To emphasize the cash flow effects related to REM, participants also learn that the
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reduction in quality control expenditures will reduce product costs. With these lower costs, the
price of products can be reduced and sales should increase. However, sales returns in future
years are likely to increase as sales of defective products are returned. Participants see the
following explanation for this option in the experimental materials.
To increase the division’s budgeted annual ROI above the 12% cost of capital, the
manager could cut quality control expenditures for the second half of FY13. This will
reduce product costs. With these lower costs, the price of products can be reduced and
sales should increase. However, sales returns in future years are likely to increase as sales
of defective products are returned.
Both earnings management options result in a significant increase in return on investment
(ROI) such that the manager just beats20 the cost of capital and will receive an annual bonus. To
make both measures equally favorable, the earnings management options would provide the
manager with the same expected ROI after proposed changes. The final phase of the experiment
includes a Post-Experimental Questionnaire. Participants answer demographic and other
classification questions in this section (See Appendix 1).
3.2.1.4 Supplemental Analyses
To rule out potential alternative explanations for the relationship between audit frequency
and independence, I ask participants to indicate whether they perceive earnings management to
be ethical, and I measure professional skepticism and organizational identification using
psychological instruments used in prior auditing research. I also examine whether certain
demographics (e.g., certifications, gender, age) affect this relationship. I make no ex ante
predictions for these alternative measures.
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Though just beating an internal earnings target is inherently different than an external target (e.g., analyst
forecast), the goal of earnings management is generally to manipulate earnings just enough to hit the target.
Excessive manipulation could be more easily identifiable and result in more scrutiny than the manager desires
(Healy 1985).
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Specifically, I ask participants whether they perceive the proposed management action to
be ethical21. This additional assessment could provide a potential explanation for how
participants make the assessments related to the two primary dependent measures. As in
Stefaniak et al. (2012), participants complete a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007)
Organizational Identification Scale. I modify these questions to relate them to Pulliam
Manufacturing. These questions collectively examine how identifying with the firm affects the
auditor’s decisions. The questions include the following: (1) “If I worked for Pulliam
Manufacturing, I would take criticism of Pulliam Manufacturing personally”; (2) “If I worked for
Pulliam Manufacturing, I would be interested in what others think about Pulliam Manufacturing;
and (3) “If I worked for Pulliam Manufacturing, I would take compliments of Pulliam
Manufacturing personally.” Participants respond to each question on a seven-point Likert-type
scale with -3 being “Strongly Disagree” and 3 being “Strongly Agree”. The aggregate score from
the three questions comprises employer identification score (Org_ID). Furthermore, as in prior
auditing research (e.g., Hurtt et al. 2008), participants complete a modified version (6 questions
vs. the full 30 questions) of the Hurtt Scale (2010) as a measure of trait (or inherent) skepticism.

3.3

Instrument Validation and Pilot Testing

3.3.1 Instrument Validation and Pilot Test 1
The experimental instrument was developed based on prior research (e.g., Hirst 1994;
Ahlawat and Lowe 2004), interviews with two chief audit executives of IAFs for publicly-traded
companies, and several internal auditors at the manager level. The final instrument was
examined by three additional chief audit executives for relevance and clarity. In addition, the
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For example, in the accrual-based earnings management setting I ask participants if they perceive the proposed
decrease in bad debt expense is ethical. I do not use the terminology earnings management anywhere in the study.
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instrument was pilot tested by three accounting faculty and 10 accounting Ph.D. students. Their
helpful comments resulted in wording changes that better express the instructions, both
experimental manipulations, and the dependent measures.
3.3.2 Pilot Test 2
After the modifications from the initial pilot test, 40 masters of accountancy students
enrolled in an Internal/Operational Auditing course during the fall of 2013 participated in a
second pilot test. Analysis of the data collected and feedback from participants resulted in minor
wording changes and adjustments to the flow of the experiment and the manipulation checks.

3.4

Participants
Practicing internal auditors were identified through the professional relationships with

chief audit executives of six publicly-traded companies, thirteen chapters of the Institute of
Internal Auditors22, and the Association of College and University Auditors. A total of 230
participants accessed the experimental instrument online through Qualtrics. Of those 230
participants, 17 indicated they were not currently practicing internal auditors,23 11 failed the
independence manipulation check, 10 failed the audit frequency manipulation check, and 19
failed both manipulation checks. All were excluded from the analysis.24 As noted in Panel A of
Table 1, the primary analyses include 173 internal auditors with an average of 14.09 years of
assurance experience. As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, 54.22% of the participants were female
and 45.78% were male. All participants had at least a bachelor’s degree, while 47.90% had a
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Participating local chapters include: Atlanta, Austin, Baltimore, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Los Angeles, Louisville,
Madison (WI), Memphis, New Orleans, Northern California – East Bay, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.
23
This only applies to the local chapters of the IIA. Academic, retired, and student members fall into this category.
24
The 40 participants failing one or both manipulation checks spent a maximum of two minutes on the task as
compared to an average of 10 minutes spent by those successfully completing both manipulation checks. There is a
significant correlation between the time spent on the task and both the response to the dependent variable and
answers to the manipulation check questions. Results are significantly different including these participants.
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master’s degree (untabulated) and participants were 50.60% staff, senior, and non-management
supervisory auditors; 30.72% managers, directors, and non-chief audit executive vice presidents;
and 18.67% chief audit executives. Of the participants, 88.48% had at least one certification
(e.g., CPA, CIA, CISA) while 47.27% had multiple certifications25. Though participants
represent a wide range of industries, the sample reflects significant participation from auditors in
financial services (15.61%), government (12.72%), higher education (32.95%)26, and
transportation (10.98%).

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Selected Mean Demographics (N = 173)a
Age
Years of Assurance Experience
Likelihood of Earnings Managementb
Organizational Identification (OrgID) Score c
Professional Skepticism (Hurtt Score) d

36 - 45 years
14.09
6.19
11.86
29.04

a

Total sample size based on the primary dependent variable (Likelihood of Earnings Management).
Participants assessed the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real earnings management
(based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely).
c
Participants complete a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007) scale which measures the level of
identification with an organization. Potential scores range from 3 (very low OrgID) to 15 (very high OrgID).
d
Participants completed a shortened version of the Hurtt (2010) scale which measures inherent skepticism. Potential
scores range from 11 (low skepticism) to 31 (high skepticism).
b

25 a

The most frequent combination of certifications is CPA/CIA.
Internal Auditors in higher education and government also indicated they had significant prior experience in a
publicly-traded company. Responses to the dependent variable are not significantly different for these industries.
The Association of College and University Auditors (ACUA) distributed to the instrument via email to members.
26
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics (continued)
Panel B: Number (Percentage) of Internal Auditors in Each Category
Gender
Female
Male
Current Position
Staff Auditors
Senior Auditors
Non-Management Supervisory Auditors
Managers & Senior Managers
Directors
Vice Presidents (non-CAE)
Chief Audit Executives (CAE)
Current Certification(s)
Certified Internal Auditor (CIA)
Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE)
Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA)
Multiple Certifications
Other Business-Related Certification
None
Industry
Construction
Financial Services
Government
Healthcare
Higher Education
Manufacturing
Retail
Technology
Transportation
Utilities
Other
Earnings Management Considered Ethicala
Yes
No
a

54.22
45.78
13.25
30.72
6.63
15.66
13.86
1.20
18.67
8.48
20.00
3.03
6.06
47.27
3.64
11.52
1.16
15.61
12.72
9.25
32.95
2.89
2.89
2.31
10.98
1.73
7.51
17.86
82.14

Participants were asked if they deemed either accrual-based or real earnings management (based on their random
assignment) was ethical.
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3.5

Summary
In this chapter I outline the methodology for this study. I conduct a 2 x 2 x 2 between-

subjects, fully factorial experiment. I differentiate this study from prior research by examining
two factors related to the internal audit function (IAF)—frequency of audits and independence—
rather than the interaction between the IAF and managers’ incentives. In addition, I separately
measure accrual-based (ABM) and real (REM) earnings management to assess the effectiveness
of continuous auditing (CA) in deterring earnings management in general and in both its forms.
A useable sample of 173 practicing internal auditors assessed the likelihood that managers would
use ABM or REM to achieve a specific earnings target that, if met, results in the manager
receiving an annual bonus.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

4.1 Continuous Auditing (IAFreq)
Hypothesis 1 predicts no difference in the perceived likelihood that continuous, relative
to periodic, auditing deters earnings management. However, Figure 1 and Panel B of Table 2
suggest that, inconsistent with my prediction, internal auditors expect earnings management to be
less likely when the IAF uses continuous (5.71) relative to periodic (6.71) auditing (p < .001).
Similarly, H1a predicts no difference in the perceived likelihood that continuous, relative to
periodic, auditing deters accrual-based earnings management (ABM). Inconsistent with H2a,
results in Figure 4 and Panel B of Table 3 indicate internal auditors expect ABM to be less likely
when the IAF uses continuous (5.57) relative to periodic (6.82) auditing (p = .008).
However, consistent with my prediction in H1b, Figure 5 and Panel B of Table 4 indicate
internal auditors expect real earnings management to be less likely when the IAF uses
continuous (5.80) relative to periodic (6.60) auditing (p = .060). As indicated in Figure 2 and
further examined in Table 5, I find that the likelihood of earnings management is significantly
lower in the CA – ABM setting (p = .026) when compared to the other three settings (CA –
REM, PA = ABM, and PA – REM).
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Figure 1: Audit Frequency x Independence (Overall)
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Figure 2: Audit Frequency x Earnings Management Type (Overall)
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4.2 Independence (Indep)
Hypothesis 2 predicts earnings management will be less (more) likely when the IAF has
separate (Indep) vs. combined (NIndep) assurance and consulting functions. While the results in
Figure 1 and Panel B of Table 2 do not support this prediction (p = .187), I do find (as indicated
in Figure 3) that the effect of Indep is context-dependent (Indep*EM_Setting, p = .037).
Inconsistent with H2a, Panels A and B of Table 3 indicates internal auditors perceive
accrual-based earnings management to be lower when the IAF is not independent (p = .019).
Results in Panels A and B of Table 4 for real earnings management are in the predicted direction
of H2b, but this direction is not statistically significant (p = .581). In Table 5, I find a
significantly lower likelihood of earnings management in the NIndep – ABM setting (p = .050),
when compared to the other three settings (NIndep – REM, Indep –ABM, and Indep – REM),
appears to drive the overall significance of the Indep x EM_Setting interaction.

Figure 3: Independence x Earnings Management Type (Overall)
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TABLE 2: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall)
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)
Continuous
Periodic
Combined
6.00
6.86
6.43
(2.53)
(1.62)
(2.13)
Independent
(n = 42)
(n = 45)
(n = 87)

Not Independent

5.40
(2.20)
(n = 46)

6.63
(1.93)
(n = 40)

6.01
(2.15)
(n = 86)

Combined

5.70
(2.37)
(n = 88)

6.74
(1.76)
(n = 85)

6.22
(2.15)
(N = 173)

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq (H1)
1
46.55
Indep (H3)
1
7.63
EM_Setting
1
0.01
IAFreq X Indep (H4a)
1
1.43
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
1.67
Indep X EM_Setting
1
19.10
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting
1
2.98
716.32
Between-subjects error
165

F
10.721
1.758
.002
.329
.385
4.400
.686

p-value
< .001
.187
.961
.567
.536
.037
.409

Dependent Variable = Internal auditors’ assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrualbased or real earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to
10 (very likely)’s mean allocation of resource units
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.

Panel C: Planned Comparisons – Overall
Contrasts
CA*Indep < CA*NIndep
CA*Indep < PA*Indep
CA*Indep < PA*NIndep
CA*NIndep < PA*Indep
CA*NIndep < (CA*Indep, PA*Indep, PA*NIndep)

Mean
Difference
0.59
-0.78
-0.63
-1.37
-3.16

Std.
Error
0.45
0.45
0.46
.44
1.08

p-value
.191
.085
.178
.002
.004

Where CA = Continuous Auditing, PA = Periodic Auditing; Indep = Independent, NIndep = Not Independent; and
ABM = Accrual-based, REM = Real earnings management.
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4.3 Continuous Auditing and Independence
Hypothesis 3 predicts that earnings management will be less (more) frequent when the
IAF uses continuous auditing and has separate assurance and consulting functions (IAFreq x
Indep). While Panel B of Table 2 does not support this prediction (p = .567), planned
comparisons in Panel C of Table 2 suggest that the likelihood of earnings management is lower
when the IAF uses continuous auditing and is not independent (5.41) than when the IAF uses
periodic auditing and is independent (6.78) (p = .002) and when compared to the other three
conditions (p = .004).

Figure 4: Audit Frequency x Independence (Accrual-Based)
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Hypothesis 3a similarly predicts that accrual-based earnings management will be less
(more) frequent when the IAF uses continuous auditing and has separate assurance and
consulting functions (IAFreq x Indep). While Panel B of Table 3 does not support this prediction
(p = .859), planned comparisons in Panel C of Table 3 suggest that the likelihood of accrualbased earnings management is lower when 1) the IAF uses continuous auditing and is
independent (6.10) than when the IAF uses periodic auditing and is independent (7.42) (p = .047)
and 2) when the IAF uses continuous auditing and is not independent (5.09) than when the IAF
uses periodic auditing and is independent (7.42) (p < .001) and when compared to the other three
conditions (p = .004).
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TABLE 3: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based)
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)
Continuous
Periodic
Combined
6.10
7.42
6.76
(2.45)
(1.30)
(2.06)
Independent
(n = 20)
(n = 19)
(n = 39)

Not Independent

5.09
(2.05)
(n = 22)

6.25
(2.17)
(n = 20)

5.67
(2.16)
(n = 42)

Combined

5.60
(2.28)
(n = 42)

6.84
(1.88)
(n = 39)

6.22
(2.17)
(N = 81)

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
31.03
Indep
1
23.99
IAFreq X Indep
1
0.13
Between-subjects error
77
322.00

F
7.43
25.74
0.03

p-value
.008
.019
.859

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.

Panel C: Planned Comparisons – Accrual-Based Earnings Management
Mean
Std.
Planned Contrasts
Difference Error
CA*Indep < CA*NIndep
1.01
0.63
CA*Indep < PA*Indep
-1.32
0.66
CA*Indep < PA*NIndep
-0.15
0.65
CA*NIndep < PA*Indep
-2.33
0.64
CA*NIndep < (CA*Indep, PA*Indep, PA*NIndep)
-4.49
1.53

p-value
.114
.047
.817
<.001
.004

Where CA = Continuous Auditing, PA = Periodic Auditing; Indep = Independent, NIndep = Not Independent; and
ABM = Accrual-based, REM = Real earnings management.
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TABLE 4: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real)
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)
Continuous
Periodic
Combined
5.91
6.31
6.11
(2.65)
(1.69)
(2.16)
Independent
(n = 22)
(n = 26)
(n = 48)

Not Independent

5.71
(2.33)
(n = 24)

7.00
(1.62)
(n = 20)

6.35
(2.11)
(n = 44)

Combined

5.81
(2.46)
(n = 46)

6.65
(1.568)
(n = 46)

6.23
(2.17)
(N = 92)

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
16.27
Indep
1
1.38
IAFreq X Indep
1
4.54
Between-subjects error
88
394.32

F
3.63
0.31
1.01

p-value
.060
.581
.317

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.

Panel C: Planned Comparisons – Real Earnings Management
Mean
Contrast
Difference
CA*Indep < CA*NIndep
0.20
CA*Indep < PA*Indep
-0.40
CA*Indep < PA*NIndep
-1.09
CA*NIndep < PA*Indep
-0.60
CA*NIndep < (CA*Indep, PA*Indep, PA*NIndep)
-2.09

Std.
Error
0.63
0.61
0.65
0.60
1.51

p-value
.749
.517
.099
.320
.169

Where CA = Continuous Auditing, PA = Periodic Auditing; Indep = Independent, NIndep = Not Independent; and
ABM = Accrual-based, REM = Real earnings management.
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Finally, hypothesis 3b predicts that real earnings management will be less (more)
frequent when the IAF uses continuous auditing and has separate assurance and consulting
functions (IAFreq x Indep). While Panel B of Table 4 does not support this prediction (p = .317),
planned comparisons in Panel C of Table 4 suggest that the likelihood of earnings management
is lower when the IAF uses continuous auditing and is independent (5.91) than when the IAF
uses periodic auditing and is not independent (7.00) (p = .099).

Figure 5: Audit Frequency x Independence (Real)
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Because the IAF is typically most familiar with the operations of the firm and is could be
less reliant on management’s assertions to identify audit findings, it is plausible that a lack of
functional independence does not negate the effects of more frequent audits. This also suggests
the IAF could potentially use this institutional knowledge to develop effective CA technology,
with sufficient information systems-related expertise, independent of a corporate-wide team.
Conversely, accrual-based earnings management involves judgment related to choosing an
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accounting method to reach a desired level of earnings and is relatively transparent in the year of
the change (Francis et al. 2005). It is plausible that effect of independence is more pronounced in
this setting because internal auditors must rely more on management’s assertions in the
development of audit findings. In a setting where the IAF is involved in the development of CA
technology, the knowledge obtained during that experience could prove beneficial during an
assurance engagement.

TABLE 5: Planned Comparisons – Across Earnings Management Types
Contrasts
CA – ABM < PA – ABM
CA – REM < PA – REM
CA – ABM < (PA – ABM, CA – REM, PA – REM)
CA – REM < (PA – REM, CA – ABM, PA – ABM)
CA – ABM = CA – REM
PA – ABM = PA – REM
Indep – ABM < NIndep – ABM
Indep – REM < NIndep – REM
Indep – ABM = Indep – REM
NIndep–ABM < (NIndep–REM, Indep–ABM, Indep–REM)
CA*Indep – ABM < CA*Indep – REM

Mean
Difference
-1.25
-0.81
-2.52
-1.59
-0.23
0.21
-1.10
0.17
0.62
-2.24
0.19

Std.
Error
0.47
0.44
1.12
1.09
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.45
0.46
1.14
0.64

pvalue
.008
.068
.026
.145
.604
.644
.022
.704
.180
.050
.767

Where CA = Continuous Auditing, PA = Periodic Auditing; Indep = Independent, NIndep = Not Independent; and
ABM = Accrual-based, REM = Real earnings management.

4.4 Supplemental Analyses
To rule out potential alternative explanations for the relationship between audit frequency
and independence, I ask participants to indicate whether they perceive earnings management to
be ethical and I measure professional skepticism and organizational identification using
psychological instruments used in prior auditing research. I also examine if selected
demographic variables (e.g., gender, certification, industry) provide any alternative explanations
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for the relationship between audit frequency and independence. For each variable I re-specify the
overall and earnings management setting-specific analyses (tabulated as indicated below). I make
no ex ante predictions for these alternative measures.
4.4.1 Perceived Ethical Nature of Earnings Management
In the Post-Experimental Questionnaire I ask participants whether they perceive earnings
management (either accrual-based or real based upon their randomly assigned setting) as ethical.
As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, 82.14% of internal auditors deem earnings management to be
unethical. I examine if this evaluation impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and
independence in mitigating the likelihood of earnings management. As indicated in Panels A and
B of Table 6 and in all prior analyses, I find that the likelihood of earnings management is lower
in the continuous (5.80) vs. periodic (6.69) auditing setting (p = .004). In addition, the Indep x
EM_Setting interaction is marginally significant (p = .087). I also find results (Tables 7 and 8)
similar to the earnings management setting-specific findings in Tables 3 and 4, which indicate
that the significance of Indep in the accrual-based earnings management setting drives the
significance of the interaction (See Figure 6 and Figure 7 in Appendix 3).
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TABLE 6: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Ethics Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management
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Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
35.77
Indep
1
10.85
EM_Setting
1
1.78
*EM_Ethical
1
27.95
1.05
IAFreq X Indep
1
3.11
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
12.07
Indep X EM_Setting
1
2.90
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting
1
Between-subjects error

159

F
8.78
2.66
0.44
6.86
0.26
0.76
2.96
0.71

p-value
.004
.105
.510
.010
.613
.384
.087
.400

647.67

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
*EM_Ethical = Participants assessed whether they perceived earnings management to be ethical. Means are adjusted
based on average response to whether earnings management is considered ethical at 1.88 (where 1 = Yes and 2 =
No). This analysis only includes the 168 participants answering the question.
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TABLE 9: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Skepticism Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management
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6.81
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Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
38.44
Indep
1
6.59
EM_Setting
1
0.00
*Skeptic
1
0.08
IAFreq X Indep
1
3.82
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
5.83
Indep X EM_Setting
1
13.23
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting
1
0.77
Between-subjects error
157
4.13

F
9.30
1.59
0.00
0.02
0.93
1.41
3.20
0.77

p-value
.003
.209
.993
.889
.338
.237
.076
.381

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
*Skeptic = Participants answered a modified version of the Hurtt Scale (2010). Participants were divided into high
and low skeptics based on a median split (29.00). This analysis only includes the 166 participants answering the
questions.
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4.4.2 Professional Skepticism
Participants completed a modified version27 of the Hurtt Scale (Hurtt 2010) which
measures trait (or inherent) skepticism. Potential scores range from 11 (low skepticism) to 31
(high skepticism). As indicated in Panel A of Table 1, the average Hurtt Scale score was 29.04.
To examine if Skepticism impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in
mitigating the likelihood of earnings management, I categorize participants, based on a median
split (29.00), as either low or high skeptics. As indicated in Table 9, I do not find that
professional skepticism, as measured in this study, is a significant predictor of the likelihood of
earnings management in either the overall or earnings management setting-specific analyses.
4.4.3 Organizational Identification (Org_ID)
Because independence is a nuanced construct, as previously indicated, I also examine one
additional way to operationalization that construct. In particular, I examine whether organization
identification (Turner 1982)—the degree to which an internal auditor identifies with the
company by which he or she is employed—enhances the effectiveness of using continuous
auditing to mitigate the likelihood of earnings management 28. I differentiate my analyses in this
study from both Bamber and Iyer(2007) and Stefaniak et. al (2012), who also examine
organizational identification. While I use the scale developed by Bamber and Iyer (2007), I

27

The original version of the scale is 30 questions with five questions for each of 6 underlying factors (e.g.,
evidence search). Subsequent studies have used a 6 question version of the scale (using the question that loads
highest on each factor) for brevity. No significant differences in using the modified vs. the full version of the scale
were noted. Where skepticism is not the primary variable of interest in this study, I use the modified version.
28
Though this experimental setting is hypothetical, prior psychology research suggests that participants’ ability to
join experimental groups, in particular when the group is natural for the participant (e.g., internal auditors in this
study could easily picture how they feel about their current company and answer the Organizational Identification
Scale (Bamber and Iyer 2007) questions accordingly). This research also suggests that identification is so powerful
that it only requires minimal cues—such as assigning people to groups by “tribes” (Sherif et al. 1961), by issuing
name badges or placing them in different rooms with different labels (Wilder 1990), or having people wear the same
color (Worchel et al. 1998). Consequently, this allowed me to leverage participants’ abilities to place themselves in
a familiar and naturally setting and to control the experimental setting (Mackie and Cooper 1984; Abrams and Hogg
1990; Mullen 1992; Van Dick et al. 2004).
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differentiate my study from theirs in that I use internal auditors, rather than external auditors, and
measure their identification with the company by which they are employed, rather than external
auditors’ identification with the firm’s largest audit client 29. My supplemental analysis most
resembles that of Stefaniak et al. (2012). Their study also uses an online experiment, requesnts
participation from local chapters of the IIA, and use a hypothetical case scenario (rather than
actual clients as in Bamber and Iyer (2007)). However, my study differs in that I do not also
measure and compare the results with the extent of client identification of external auditors and
my setting is different 30. Several important findings from Stefaniak et al. (2012) are relevant to
my study and guide my expectations in the current study. Organizational Identification was
significantly higher for internal auditors than for external auditors at the p < .001 level. In
isolation, this finding supports findings in prior auditing research that thought suggested by the
PCAOB (Bamber and Iyer 2007), actual external auditor reliance on the internal audit function is
lower because of the perception of inability to provide independent assurance to their firms (e.g.,
higher Org_ID) (see Bame-Aldred et al. 2013, for a review of the literature). However, contrary
to this prior research, Stefaniak et al. (2012) suggest that internal auditors with higher levels of
Org_ID are less lenient than external auditors (i.e., tend to support management’s preferred
position to a lesser extent)31. The prior auditing research presents two ways to interpret the
implications of low (high) Org_ID and its association with auditor independence. On the one
hand, internal auditor independence could be impaired when there is a significant psychological

29

These two studies juxtapose client identification (external auditors) with Organizational Identification (internal
auditors), but use the two interchangeably.
30
The authors request participation from one local chapter of the IIA (in my study I have a cross-section of auditors,
industries, and firms represented in that I use 15 chapters) and a list of practicing external auditors (I do not use
external auditors but this is an area for future research). The primary dependent variable is the auditor’s assessment
of the likelihood that hypothetical company’s information technology access controls could not prevent or quickly
detect a material misstatement (Stefaniak et al. 2012).
31
As in Bamber and Iyer (2007), Stefaniak et al. (2012) find that higher client identification for external auditors are
associated with more leniency with the auditee. This also presents an area for future research.
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attachment to his or her employer. In essence, the auditor could be more willing to protect the
company (Thompson 1995). However, once attached, the auditor could have difficulty
objectively evaluating information related to the company (e.g., the likelihood a manager will
engage in earnings management) (Brewer 1999). The external auditor reliance literature follows
this line of reasoning and, thus, suggests that auditors with low (high) Org_ID are also more
independent (less independent). Alternatively, as previously indicated, Stefaniak et al. (2012)
find that internal auditors with low (high) Org_ID were more (less) lenient in their willingness to
accept a manager’s assertion. This result suggests that auditors with high (low) Org_ID are also
more independent (less independent). It is unclear which explanation is applicable and whether
the context matters. Consequently, I make no ex ante predictions related to Org_ID.
In the current study, I measure Org_ID using a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer
(2007) Organizational Identification Scale. I modify the original statements to relate them to
Pulliam Manufacturing (the hypothetical company in the experiment). The statements include:
(1) “If I worked for Pulliam Manufacturing, I would take criticism of Pulliam Manufacturing
personally”; (2) “If I worked for Pulliam Manufacturing, I would be interested in what others
think about Pulliam Manufacturing; and (3) “If I worked for Pulliam Manufacturing, I would
take compliments of Pulliam Manufacturing personally.” Participants respond to each question
on a seven-point Likert-type scale with 1 being “Strongly Disagree” and 7 being “Strongly
Agree”. The aggregate score from the three questions constitute the Org_ID score. Potential
scores range from 3 (very low Org_ID) to 15 (very high Org_ID), where lower Org_ID suggests
higher independence. As indicated in Panel A of Table 1, the average Org_ID32 score is 11.86.
I examine if Org_ID impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in

32

Crohnbach alpha for my study is .70 whereas it is .80 in Stefaniak et al. (2012).
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mitigating the likelihood of earnings management. In Panels A and B of Table 12, I find that
Org_ID (measured as low or high organizational identification based on a median split (12.00))
is a significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings management overall (p = .018) 33, which
suggests internal auditors with high (low) Org_ID perceive the likelihood of earnings
management to be higher (lower). Controlling for Org_ID in respecifying the original ANOVA
(see Panel B of Table 2) resulted in no change in the statistical significance of IAFreq (p = .004);
however, the IAFreq x EM_Setting interaction became only moderately significant (p = .068). I
also examine the aforementioned relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. In
Panels A and B of Table 13 (in Appendix 3) for the ABM setting, I find that Org_ID (measured
as previously indicated) is a significant predictor of the likelihood of ABM management (p =
.035), internal auditors with high (low) Org_ID perceive the likelihood of ABM to be higher
(lower). Controlling for Org_ID in respecifying the primary analyses in Table 3, I find that both
IAFreq (p = .015) and Indep (p = .037) remain statistically significant, while the interaction (p =
.907) does not. In Panels A and B of Table 14 (in Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that
Org_ID (measured as previously indicated) is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of
REM management (p = .195), suggesting there is no difference in the perceived likelihood of
REM between internal auditors with high or low Org_ID. Controlling for Org_ID in respecifying
the primary analyses in Table 4, I find that neither IAFreq (p = .169), Indep (p = .673), nor the
interaction (p = .177) is statistically significant. These findings, however, do present an avenue
for future research34.

33

As discussed further in Chapter 5, I respecify my analyses such that I replace Independence with Org_ID. As
noted in Table 15, inconsistent with anecdotal evidence from external auditors and prior external audit reliance
literature, but consistent with Stefaniak et al. (2012), I find that the likelihood of earnings management is lower in
the low (5.88) vs. high (6.74) Org_ID setting (p = .017).
34
In Appendix 3, I also control for independence (using the original measure of independences as a covariate) in the
examination of the effect of organizational identification on the perceived likelihood of earnings management
overall (Table 30 and Figures 22 and 23) and in the accrual-based (Table 31) and real (Table 32) earnings
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TABLE 12: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) –
Organizational Identification Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

6.90

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.78
6.68

6.60

Independent
6.30

6.16
Not
Independent

6.00

5.70
5.50
5.40
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
33.16
Indep
1
6.05
EM_Setting
1
0.55
*Org_ID
1
22.87
IAFreq X Indep
1
3.25
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
3.52
Indep X EM_Setting
1
13.45
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting
1
4.03
Between-subjects error
157
626.20

F
8.31
1.52
0.14
5.73
0.81
0.88
3.37
1.01

p-value
.004
.220
.710
.018
.368
.349
.068
.316

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
* Org_ID = Participants are classified as either low or high Org_ID based on median score of 12.00.
management settings. In these tests, I am specifically interested in whether participants’ exposure to the
independence manipulation could affect their level of organizational independence. While the overall results are
similar to Tables 12, 13, and 14, independence is only a significant predictor (p = .033) in the accrual-based
earnings management setting (See Panel B of Table 13). This presents an area for future research.
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4.4.4 Gender
In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated their gender. As indicated
in Panel B of Table 1, 54.22% (45.78%) of the participants were female (male). I, thus, examine
if Gender impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in mitigating the
likelihood of earnings management. In Panels A and B of Table 18, I find that Gender (measured
as Male = 1 and Female = 2) is a marginally significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings
management overall (p = .062), which suggests that female internal auditors perceive the
likelihood of earnings management to be higher than do male internal auditors. Controlling for
Gender in respecifying the original ANOVA (see Panel B of Table 2) resulted in no change in
the statistical significance of IAFreq (p = .007); however, the IAFreq x EM_Setting interaction
became only moderately significant (p = .075). I also examine the aforementioned relationship
specifically in the ABM and REM settings. In Panels A and B of Table 19 (in Appendix 3) for the
ABM setting, I find that Gender (measured as previously indicated) is a significant predictor of
the likelihood of ABM management (p = .005), suggesting that female internal auditors perceive
the likelihood of ABM to be higher than male internal auditors do. Controlling for Gender in
respecifying the primary analyses in Table 3, I find that both IAFreq (p = .019) and Indep (p =
.060) remain statistically significant, while the interaction (p = .661) does not. In Panels A and B
of Table 20 (in Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that Gender (measured as previously
indicated) is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of REM management (p = .980),
suggesting there is no difference in the perceived likelihood of REM between female and male
internal auditors. Controlling for Gender in respecifying the primary analyses in Table 4, I find
that neither IAFreq (p = .191), Indep (p = .705), nor the interaction (p = .202) is statistically
significant.
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TABLE 18: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Gender Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

6.90

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.76
6.60
6.61
Independent
6.30

6.15
Not
Independent

6.00

5.70
5.48
5.40
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
31.223
Indep
1
6.895
EM_Setting
1
.520
*Gender
1
14.747
IAFreq X Indep
1
2.745
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
3.465
Indep X EM_Setting
1
13.373
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting
1
6.327
Between-subjects error
157
653.330

F
7.503
1.657
.125
3.544
.660
.833
3.214
1.520

p-value
.007
.200
.724
.062
.418
.363
.075
.219

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
*Gender = Male (1) vs. Female (2).
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4.4.5 Years of Assurance Experience
In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated the number of years they
have in providing assurance services35. As indicated in Panel A of Table 1, participants have on
average 14.09 years of assurance experience36. To examine if Years of Assurance Experience
impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in mitigating the likelihood of
earnings management, I categorize participants as either low or high assurance experience based
on a median split of 12.50 years. In Panels A and B of Table 21, I find that Years of Assurance
Experience is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings management overall (p =
.979), likely because of less deviation from the mean number of years’ experience. I also
examine the aforementioned relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. As indicated
in Panels A and B of Table 22 for the ABM setting, and Panels A and B of Table 23 (both in
Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that Years of Assurance Experience (measured as
previously indicated) is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of either ABM (p = .762) or
REM management (p = .746).

35

I do not ask participants to differentiate between internal and external audit assurance.
I also ask participants about the number of years they have been in their current position (untabulated mean 7.05)
and how many total years of business experience (untabulated mean 18.55) they have.
36
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TABLE 21: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) –
Assurance Experience Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.90

6.81

6.60
6.63
Independent
6.30

6.15
Not
Independent

6.00

5.70
5.44
5.40
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
34.67
Indep
1
8.05
EM_Setting
1
0.05
*AUD_EXP
1
0.00
IAFreq X Indep
1
2.75
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
7.28
Indep X EM_Setting
1
11.36
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting
1
2.20
Between-subjects error
156
639.23

F
8.46
1.97
0.01
0.00
0.67
1.78
2.77
0.54

p-value
.004
.163
.913
.979
.414
.185
.098
.465

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
*AUD_EXP = Participants divided into low (high) assurance experience based on median of 12.50 years.
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4.4.6 Certification
In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated which certifications they
currently held. As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, 88.48% of participants37 held at least one
certification. To examine if Certification impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and
independence in mitigating the likelihood of earnings management, I categorize participants as
either certified (1) or not certified (0). In Panels A and B of Table 24, I find that Certification is
not a significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings management overall (p = .155), likely
because of the significant number of participants with at least one certification 38. I also examine
the aforementioned relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. As indicated in
Panels A and B of Table 25 for the ABM setting, and Panels A and B of Table 26 (both in
Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that Certification (measured as previously indicated) is
not a significant predictor of the likelihood of either ABM (p = .213) or REM management (p =
.473).

37

As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, 47.27% of the participants had multiple certifications (most commonly
CPA/CIA). I also examine the effect of certifications on the perceived likelihood of earnings management and find
similar results.
38
I also examine whether the type of certification (e.g., CPA, CIA, PMP) affected the perceived likelihood of
earnings management and find similar results.
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TABLE 24: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Certification Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

6.90

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.79
6.69
6.60
Independent
6.30

6.17
Not
Independent

6.00

5.70
5.45
5.40
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
35.730
Indep
1
6.916
EM_Setting
1
.022
*Certification
1
8.366
IAFreq X Indep
1
3.899
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
6.076
Indep X EM_Setting
1
10.799
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting
1
3.941
Between-subjects error
156
640.409

F
8.704
1.685
.005
2.038
.950
1.480
2.631
.960

p-value
.004
.196
.942
.155
.331
.226
.107
.329

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
*Certification = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) a
certification.
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4.4.7 External Audit Experience
In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated which certifications they
currently held. In this analysis, I use participants who held a CPA license as a proxy for external
audit assurance experience. Prior auditing research suggests there are differences in how external
and internal auditors assess managers’ decisions (e.g., earnings management) (e.g., Stefaniak et
al. 2012; Bame-Aldred et al. 2013; Commerford et al. 2013). While this is not a perfect measure,
internal auditors with solely a CPA license or who have a CPA license in conjunction with other
licenses have at least two years of external audit experience. As indicated in Panel B of Table 1,
20.00% of participants held only a CPA certification, while another 19.14% (untabulated) held a
CPA certification in conjunction with another certification (e.g., CPA/CIA). To examine if
External Audit Experience impacts the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in
mitigating the likelihood of earnings management, I categorize participants as either having (1)
or not having (0) a CPA certification. In Panels A and B of Table 27, I find that External Audit
Experience is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings management overall (p =
.617). I also examine the aforementioned relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings.
As indicated in Panels A and B of Table 28 for the ABM setting, and Panels A and B of Table 29
(both in Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that External Audit Experience (measured as
previously indicated) is not a significant predictor of the likelihood of either ABM (p = .560) or
REM management (p = .875).
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TABLE 27: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) –
External Audit Experience Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

6.90

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.80
6.72
6.60
Independent
6.30
Not
Independent

6.02
6.00

5.70
5.43
5.40
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
44.53
Indep
1
4.69
EM_Setting
1
0.22
*EA_EXP
1
1.08
IAFreq X Indep
1
2.70
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
3.87
Indep X EM_Setting
1
17.11
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting
1
1.41
Between-subjects error
159
684.58

F
10.34
1.09
0.05
0.25
0.63
0.89
3.97
0.33

p-value
.002
.298
.820
.617
.429
.345
.048
.569

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
*EA_EXP = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) external audit
experience (proxied by only a CPA license).
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4.4.8 Industry
In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated the industry that most
closely represents the firm by which they are employed. As indicated in Panel B of Table 1,
these firms represent at least 11 different industries. Because continuous auditing requires a
significant amount of technology and some assurance tasks are easier than others to automate
(Brown et al. 2007), I am interested in whether Industry impacts the effectiveness of audit
frequency and independence in mitigating the likelihood of earnings management. I categorize
participants based on current position (dummy coded in the order presented in Panel B of Table
1).In Panels A and B of Table 33, I find that Industry is not a significant predictor of the
likelihood of earnings management overall (p = .567). I also examine the aforementioned
relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. As indicated in Panels A and B of Table
34 for the ABM setting, and Panels A and B of Table 35 (both in Appendix 3) for the REM
setting, I find that Industry (measured as previously indicated) is not a significant predictor of the
likelihood of either ABM (p = .801) or REM management (p = .618).
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TABLE 33: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Industry Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

6.90

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.85
6.60

6.62
Independent

6.30
Not
Independent

6.01
6.00

5.70
5.41
5.40
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
45.000
Indep
1
7.266
EM_Setting
1
.020
*Industry
1
1.276
IAFreq X Indep
1
1.433
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
1.541
Indep X EM_Setting
1
18.641
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting
1
2.875
Between-subjects error
164
715.039

F
10.321
1.666
.004
.293
.329
.353
4.276
.659

p-value
.002
.199
.947
.589
.567
.553
.040
.418

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
*Industry = Dummy Code that represents the industry that most closely represents participants’ employer.
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4.4.9 Title
In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, participants indicated the title that most closely
matched their current position in the firm by which they are employed. As indicated in Panel B
of Table 1, 50.60% are staff, senior, and non-management supervisory auditors; 30.72%
managers, directors (non-CAE), and vice presidents (non-CAE); and 18.67% were chief audit
executives (CAE). Prior research suggests that auditors become less skeptical with more
experience (Nelson 2009). As a result, I examine if the internal auditor’s position (Title) impacts
the effectiveness of audit frequency and independence in mitigating the likelihood of earnings
management. I categorize participants based on current position (dummy coded in the order
presented in Panel B of Table 1). In Panels A and B of Table 36, I find that Title is not a
significant predictor of the likelihood of earnings management overall (p = .841). I also examine
the aforementioned relationship specifically in the ABM and REM settings. As indicated in
Panels A and B of Table 37 for the ABM setting, and Panels A and B of Table 38 (both in
Appendix 3) for the REM setting, I find that Title (measured as previously indicated) is not a
significant predictor of the likelihood of either ABM (p = .247) or REM management (p = .369).

4.5 Summary of Results
Taken together these findings suggest that more frequent audits help to deter earnings
management, but auditor independence (separate vs. combined assurance and consulting
functions) is most important in deterring ABM. These findings are consistent with both anecdotal
and empirical research (e.g., Church and Schneider 1992) on the IAF. Real earnings management
involves the timing and or magnitude of operating decisions (Francis et al. 2005).
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TABLE 36: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Title Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

6.90

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.81
6.72
6.60
Independent
6.30

6.15
Not Independent

6.00

5.70
5.43
5.40
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
38.646
Indep
1
6.689
EM_Setting
1
.002
*Title
1
.167
IAFreq X Indep
1
3.907
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
6.074
Indep X EM_Setting
1
13.534
IAFreq X Indep X EM_Setting
1
3.132
Between-subjects error
157
648.900

F
9.350
1.618
.000
.040
.945
1.470
3.275
.758

p-value
.003
.205
.984
.841
.332
.227
.072
.385

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
*Title = Dummy Code that represents the position currently held by each participant.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

5.1

Conclusion
This study examines the notion that continuous, relative to periodic, auditing helps to

decrease the likelihood of earnings management. Because the internal audit function (IAF) often
serves in a consulting role during the development of the continuous auditing technology, then
subsequently uses it in its assurance role, I also examine whether functionally segregating these
roles increases the probability of reporting any earnings management identified. I find that
earnings management is less likely when the IAF uses continuous auditing. However, the
effectiveness of functional alignment is context-specific. In the accrual-based (ABM) earnings
management setting, I find that internal auditors expect ABM to be less likely when the IAF uses
continuous auditing. However, contrary to my predictions I find that auditors expect ABM to be
less likely when the IAF is not independent. Similarly, in the real earnings management (REM)
setting, I find that internal auditors expect REM to be less likely when the IAF uses continuous
auditing and when the IAF is independent. These findings are consistent with both anecdotal and
empirical research on the IAF. This study complements archival research and contributes to
auditing research, auditing standards development, and the debate over the feasibility vs.
effectiveness of implementing continuous auditing in a firm.
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5.2

Limitations
My study may suffer from limitations that are typical of experimental studies. For

example, the design choices create a very specific context that does not include every important
feature of auditing practice. These features, could affect the way in which auditors assess the
likelihood of earnings management. Importantly, however, I argue that my setting captures the
essential characteristics of both a hypothetical (continuous auditing) and traditional (periodic
auditing) internal audit setting. In addition, this design allows me to also examine the effect of
independence (measured as separate vs. combined assurance and consulting) on the effectiveness
of continuous auditing while holding all else constant. Therefore, adding additional institutional
features is unlikely to change that basic relationship that is the focus of this study.

5.3

Implications for Future Research
My results suggest many avenues for research in auditing and earnings management. Here

I discuss two potential extensions. First, my study avoided mention of both the quality of the
internal audit function and the impact that annual external audits may have on the effectiveness
of continuous auditing. While I contribute to the prior literature that examines the effects of
auditing on earnings management, I do not consider how the quality of the IAF in conjunction
with external audit quality affect how managers use, shift between, or substitute accrual-based
(ABM) and real (REM) earnings management. In an archival study, using both proprietary and
publicly available archival data, future research could use a matched sample of firms to
investigate if there is a moderation in the level of both ABM and REM, extending Prawitt et al.
(2009), and whether managers either shift from ABM to the more costly REM (as in Cohen and
Zarowin 2010; Geiger and Rama 2006) or use the two as substitutes (as in Institute of Internal
Auditors (IIA) 2003) throughout the fiscal year. Second, as indicated in the supplemental
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analyses and prior internal auditing research, there are other proxies for examining independence
in the internal audit setting (e.g. outsourcing, organizational position, and corporate policy
statements). While the operationalization in this study complemented the fact that the IAF helped
to create the continuous auditing technology, it is plausible from the supplemental analyses that a
different operationalization of independence could increase the effectiveness of continuous
auditing in mitigating earnings management39.

39

See the results in Tables 15, 16, and 17, specifically.
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APPENDIX 1: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
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The following experimental materials show all eight treatment conditions.
For the independent variables, the heading “Internal Audit Background” includes the
assurance-only (independent) IAF condition in brackets [] and the combined assurance and
consulting (not independent) IAF condition in parentheses (). The heading “Audits of Corporate
Functions by the Internal Audit Department” includes the continuous auditing condition in
brackets [] and the periodic auditing condition in parentheses ().
For the dependent variables, the Accrual-Based (ABM) and Real Earnings (REM) Management
decisions are presented in succession within this instrument; however, only one decision is made
per subject (ABM or REM), see below.
Potential Treatment Conditions (IV1 – IV2 – DV):
1. Continuous Auditing – Independent – Accrual-Based Earnings Management
2. Continuous Auditing – Not Independent – Accrual-Based Earnings Management
3. Continuous Auditing – Independent – Real Earnings Management
4. Continuous Auditing – Not Independent – Real Earnings Management
5. Periodic Auditing – Independent – Accrual-Based Earnings Management
6. Periodic Auditing – Not Independent – Accrual-Based Earnings Management
7. Periodic Auditing – Independent – Real Earnings Management
8. Periodic Auditing – Not Independent – Real Earnings Management
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Instructions: This business decision making study is a critical portion of my dissertation. For
the study, please read the following information carefully. After these instructions, you will
make decisions based on a scenario and answer a short questionnaire. Please answer the
questions fully and to the best of your abilities, given the limited amount of information
provided. The study should take about 10-15 minutes to complete. Please complete it in its
entirety once you begin.
Privacy: Your participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Your responses are anonymous
and untraceable.
Incentive: In exchange for your participation, you have the option to participate in a drawing for
one of five (5) electronic gift certificates from Amazon – four valued at $50, and one valued at
$100. Any contact information provided will be kept in a separate file from your survey
responses.
IRB Approval: This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB). If you have any questions, concerns, or reports regarding your rights as a
participant of research, please contact the IRB at (662) 915-7482 or irb@olemiss.edu.
Please pay careful attention to all of the information provided. There is no right or wrong
answer. I am interested in your professional judgment.
Informed Consent:
I have had the purposes and procedures of this study explained to me and have had the
opportunity to ask questions. By selecting accept, you will be able to proceed with the
survey, while rejection requires that you discontinue the survey.
 Accept (and continue survey)
 Reject (and exit survey)
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Company Information: Pulliam Manufacturing, Inc. is an American global, publicly-traded,
manufacturer. Pulliam’s assets are valued in excess of $4 Billion and last year it reported revenue
of $46 Billion and net income of approximately $5 Billion.
Pulliam grants divisional managers annual bonuses when the division’s return on investment
(ROI) exceeds 12% (Pulliam’s current cost of capital). Expenses related to a long-term project
(which began in 2011 and is expected to be completed in 2016) have a significant impact on ROI
for a division you plan to audit, according to the aforementioned audits of corporate functions.
The division's ROI is reduced when there are significant internal audit findings reported to
management.
Current Divisional ROI: Assume the following has been recorded for the division as of June
30, 2013. The table below shows the division's projected and actual ROI for the first half of
FY13 (January – June). The table also shows the projected ROI for the full year if the manager
makes no changes during the second half of the year.

1st Half FY13

Projected ROI
10%

Actual ROI
10%

11%

?

Full Year FY13
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Background on Your Internal Audit Department
On the next page, you will be asked to estimate a typical division manager’s response to a set of
circumstances prior to your next audit of his division. When making your estimate of the
manager’s response, assume the following about your internal audit department.
1. Internal Audit Department: Your department has [separate] (combined) assurance (e.g.
audits) and consulting (e.g. special projects like developing new software) functions.
2. Audits of Corporate Functions by the Internal Audit Department: Your department
conducts assurance engagements on a [continuous] (rotating) basis such that divisions are
audited [at all times] (once every three years) [using automated software your department
helped to create and that is available for corporate-wide use]. Any significant variances and
control exceptions are reported [continuously] (whenever the audit is complete) to all
divisional and senior management. The last audit of this division was [yesterday] (last year) and
there were no significant findings.
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ACCRUAL-BASED EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Manager’s Options: To increase the division’s budgeted annual ROI above the 12% cost of
capital, the manager could reduce bad debt expense for the second half of FY13. By reducing the
allowance for uncollectible accounts percentage for accounts over 90-days due from 50% to 25%
the division will significantly decrease the bad debt expense. Collection patterns for prior years
are inconclusive as support for the reduction in the allowance percentage.
The table below shows the projected impact on FY13 ROI if the manager selects either option.

Do Nothing

Projected ROI
11%

Cost of Capital
12%

Bonus Result
No Bonus Awarded

13%

12%

Bonus Awarded

Reduce
Expenses

Required: Assuming managers are aware of the internal audit department auditing practices
described on the previous page…
How likely would a manager working for a company such as Pulliam Manufacturing reduce bad
debt expense for the second half of FY13? (check one)
1
Very
Unlikely

2

3

4

5

6
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7

8

9

10
Very
Likely

REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Manager’s Options: To increase the division’s budgeted annual ROI above the 12% cost of
capital, the manager could cut quality control expenditures for the second half of FY13. This will
reduce product costs. With these lower costs, the price of products can be reduced and sales
should increase. However, sales returns in future years are likely to increase as sales of defective
products are returned.
The table below shows the projected impact on FY13 ROI if the manager selects either option.
Projected ROI Cost of Capital
Bonus Result
11%
12%
No Bonus Awarded

Do Nothing

13%

Cut Quality Control Expenditures

12%

Bonus Awarded

REQUIRED: Assuming managers are aware of the internal audit department auditing practices
described on the previous page…
How likely would a manager working for a company such as Pulliam Manufacturing cut quality
control expenditures for the second half of FY13? (check one)
1
Very
Unlikely

2

3

4

5

6
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7

8

9

10
Very
Likely

Post Experimental Questionnaire – Questions About the Case (Manipulation Checks)
How did Pulliam Manufacturing's internal audit department conduct assurance and consulting
engagements? (CHECK ONE)
 The department has separate assurance and consulting functions.
 The department has combined assurance and consulting functions.
How often did Pulliam Manufacturing's internal audit department perform audits of divisions
and report the results? (CHECK ONE)
 The internal audit department audited divisions continuously.
 The internal audit department audited divisions every three years.
Post Experimental Questionnaire – Questions About the Case
Do you consider the proposed reduction of (bad debt expense) [quality control expenditures] to
be ethical?
 Yes
 No
Post Experimental Questionnaire – Organizational Identification (Supplemental Analyses)
If I worked for Pulliam
Manufacturing, I would...

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

...take criticism of Pulliam
Manufacturing personally.













...be interested in what others think
about Pulliam Manufacturing.













...take compliments of Pulliam
Manufacturing personally.
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Post Experimental Questionnaire – Professional Skepticism (Supplemental Analyses)
Following are statements that people use to describe themselves. Please select the response
that indicates how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend
too much time on any one statement.
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

I take my time when
making decisions.













I tend to immediately
accept what other people
tell me.













My friends tell me that I
usually question things that
I see or hear.













I like to understand the
reason for other people’s
behavior.













I think that learning is
exciting.













I have confidence in
myself.













INCENTIVE FOR PARTICIPATION – Presented on a separate screen at the conclusion of
the study (external link provided) to maintain anonymity of responses.
Thank you for participating in this study. In exchange for your participation, you will be entered
into a drawing and eligible to win one of five gift certificates from Amazon – four valued at $50,
and one valued at $100. Your participation in the raffle is OPTIONAL. If you are interested in
participating in this raffle, please enter your email address below. Your contact information will
be kept in a separate file from your survey responses.

***Email Address (used only to provide the incentive): _____________________________
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Post Experimental Questionnaire – Demographic Information
Please indicate your gender
 Male

 Female

Please select the range that includes your age
 20-25
 31-40
 46-50
 26-30
 41-45

 over
50

Highest degree held:
 Associate’s

 Master’s

Undergraduate Degree:
 Accounting/Finance
 Other Business

 Bachelor’s
 Engineering
 Sciences

Certification(s) held:
 Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
 Project Management Professional (PMP)
 Certified Internal Auditor (CIA)
 Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE)
 Six Sigma (any level)

 Doctorate/PhD
 Liberal Arts (nonscience)

 Certified Info Systems Auditor (CISA)
 Certified Info Systems Security Prof
(CISSP)
 Other Business Certification
 No Certification

Which of the following most closely relates to your current position in your department?
 Intern – Bachelor’s Level
 Senior Auditor
 Director
 Intern – Master’s Level
 Audit Advisor/Supervisor
 VP (other than CAE)
 Associate Auditor
 Manager
 Chief Audit Executive
 Staff Auditor
 Senior Manager
 Other
For how many years have you held you current position? _____
Total number years of business work experience (post-Bachelor’s degree)? _______
Please check the industry in which your firm primarily conducts business:
 Mining/Oil/Gas
 Construction
 Transportation
 Manufacturing
 Retail
 Financial Services
 Health Care
 Technology
 Government
 Utilities
 Other Services
 Higher Education
 Other
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Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Ethics Covariate
Figure 6: Audit Frequency x Earning Management Type (Overall – Adjusted)

6.90

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.75
6.69

6.60
Accrual
6.30
6.03

Real

6.00

5.70

5.55

5.40
Continuous

Periodic

Participants assessed the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real earnings management
(based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). I manipulate audit
frequency (continuous vs. periodic) and auditor independence (separate vs. combined assurance and consulting
functions). Means are adjusted based on average response to whether earnings management is considered ethical at
1.88 (where 1 = Yes and 2 = No).

Figure 7: Independence x Earning Management Type (Overall – Adjusted)
6.80

6.68

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.60

6.40

6.37

6.35

Accrual
6.20
Real
6.00

5.80
5.63
5.60
Independent

Not Independent
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TABLE 7: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – Ethics Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

Likelihood of Earnings Management

7.50
7.40
7.00

6.50

Independent
6.09

6.24

6.00

Not Independent

5.50

5.00

5.13
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
IAFreq
Indep
*EM_Ethical
IAFreq X Indep
Between-subjects error

Df

SS

F

p-value

1
1
1
1
74

28.85
22.14
9.59
0.20
312.39

6.83
5.24
2.27
0.05

.011
.025
.136
.828

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*EM_Ethical = Participants assessed whether they perceived earnings management to be ethical. Means are adjusted
based on average response to whether earnings management is considered ethical at 1.88 (where 1 = Yes and 2 =
No). This analysis only includes the 79 participants answering the question.
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TABLE 8: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Ethics Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)

7.00

6.75

6.82
6.50

Independent
6.44

6.25

Not Independent
6.16

6.00

5.75

5.77
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
9.54
Indep
1
0.00
*EM_Ethical
1
21.03
IAFreq X Indep
1
3.19
Between-subjects error
84
332.61

F
2.41
0.00
5.31
0.81

p-value
.124
.992
.024
.372

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*EM_Ethical = Participants assessed whether they perceived earnings management to be ethical. Means are adjusted
based on average response to whether earnings management is considered ethical at 1.88 (where 1 = Yes and 2 =
No). This analysis only includes the 89 participants answering the question.
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TABLE 10: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – Skepticism Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)

Likelihood of Earnings Management

7.50
7.43
7.00

6.50

6.00

6.47

Independent

6.10
Not Independent

5.50

5.00

5.09
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
35.50
Indep
1
18.59
*Skeptic
1
0.13
0.01
IAFreq X Indep
1
Between-subjects error

73

F
8.56
4.48
0.03
0.00

p-value
.005
.038
.863
.955

302.84

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Skeptic = Participants answered a modified version of the Hurtt Scale (2010). Participants were divided into high
and low skeptics based on a median split (29.00). This analysis only includes the 78 participants answering the
questions.
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TABLE 11: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Skepticism Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)
7.00
6.96
6.75

6.50

Independent

6.25

Not Independent
6.21

6.19

6.00

5.75

5.76

Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
7.69
Indep
1
0.58
*Skeptic
1
0.51
7.39
IAFreq X Indep
1
Between-subjects error
83
345.59

F
1.85
0.14
0.12
1.86

p-value
.178
.709
.727
.176

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Skeptic = Participants answered a modified version of the Hurtt Scale (2010). Participants were divided into high
and low skeptics based on a median split (29.00). This analysis only includes the 88 participants answering the
questions.
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Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Organizational Identification Covariate
Figure 8: Audit Frequency x Earning Management Type (Overall – Adjusted)
7.10

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.94
6.80

6.53

6.50

Real

6.20

5.90

Accrual

5.92
5.74

5.60
Continuous

Periodic

Participants assessed the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real earnings management
(based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). I manipulate audit
frequency (continuous vs. periodic) and auditor independence (separate vs. combined assurance and consulting
functions). Means are adjusted based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007)
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00.

Figure 9: Independence x Earning Management Type (Overall – Adjusted)
7.00
6.82

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.80

6.60
Accrual
6.40

6.32
Real

6.20
6.13
6.00
5.86
5.80
Independent

Not Independent
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TABLE 13: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –
Organizational Identification Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.50
7.34
7.00

6.50

Independent
6.34

6.00

6.15

Not Independent

5.50
5.25
5.00
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
24.35
Indep
1
17.54
*Org_ID
1
17.99
0.05
IAFreq X Indep
1
Between-subjects error
73
284.98

F
6.24
4.49
4.61
0.01

p-value
.015
.037
.035
.907

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Org_ID = Means are adjusted based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007)
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00 .
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TABLE 14: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) –
Organizational Identification Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management
7.00
6.97
6.75

6.50

Independent

6.25

Not Independent
6.18

6.20

6.00

5.75

5.78
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
7.88
Indep
1
0.73
*Org_ID
1
6.99
7.58
IAFreq X Indep
1
Between-subjects error

83

F
1.93
0.18
1.71
1.86

p-value
.169
.673
.195
.177

339.11

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Org_ID = Means are adjusted based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007)
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00.
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TABLE 15: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Organizational Identification
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management (standard deviations in parentheses)
Continuous
Periodic
Combined
5.44
6.42
5.93
(2.32)
(1.80)
(2.14)
Low
(n = 51)
(n = 43)
(n = 94)

High

6.32
(2.26)
(n = 33)

7.12
(1.52)
(n = 39)

6.72
(1.91)
(n = 72)

Combined

5.88
(2.33)
(n = 84)

6.77
(1.69)
(n = 82)

6.32
(2.17)
(N = 166)

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence – Organizational Identification)
Df
SS
F
p-value
IAFreq
1
30.09
7.37
.007
Org_ID
1
23.69
5.80
.017
EM_Setting
1
1.07
0.26
.610
IAFreq X Org_ID
1
0.30
0.07
.786
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
3.97
0.97
.326
Org_ID X EM_Setting
1
2.24
0.55
.460
IAFreq X Org_ID X EM_Setting
1
3.94
0.96
.328
Between-subjects error
158
645.29
Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very
likely)’s mean allocation of resource units
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
Org_ID = Measured using Bamber and Iyer (2007) three-question scale, each question measured on a seven-point
Likert-type scale with 1 being “Strongly Disagree” and 7 being “Strongly Agree”. Participants are classified as
either low or high Org_ID based on median score of 12.00. Low (High) Org_ID corresponds to the independent (not
independent) classifications in the prior analyses. Analysis includes participants fully completing the scale.
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Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Organizational Identification
Figure 10: Audit Frequency x Independence (Organizational Identification) (Overall)
7.12

Likelihood of Earnings Management

7.15
6.90
6.65
6.40

6.42

6.32

Low

High

6.15
5.90
5.65
5.44
5.40
Continuous

Periodic

Participants assessed the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real earnings management
(based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). I measure
independence in this setting using the Bamber and Iyer (2007) Organization Identification Scale and divide
participants into low and high organizational identification based on the median score of 12.00.

Figure 11: Audit Frequency x Earnings Management Type (Overall)
7.15
7.01

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.95
6.75

Accrual

6.55
6.52
6.35

Real

6.15
5.96

5.95
5.80
5.75
Continuous

Periodic
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Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) – Organizational Identification
Figure 12: Independence (Organizational Identification) x Earnings Management Type (Overall)
7.00

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.92
6.80

6.60

Accrual
6.51
6.40
Real
6.20

6.00

5.97
5.89

5.80
Low

High

Participants assessed the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real earnings management
(based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). I measure
independence in this setting using the Bamber and Iyer (2007) Organization Identification Scale and divide
participants into low and high organizational identification based on the median score of 12.00.
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TABLE 16: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –
Organizational Identification
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management
7.80

Likelihood of Earnings Management

7.65

7.30

6.80
6.38
6.30

6.20

5.80

5.30

5.40
Continuous

Periodic
Low

High

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
24.59
Org_ID
1
17.80
0.91
IAFreq X Org_ID
1
Between-subjects error
74
301.64

F
6.03
4.37
0.22

p-value
.016
.040
.639

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Org_ID = Means are adjusted based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007)
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00.
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TABLE 17: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) –
Organizational Identification
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management
6.65

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.59
6.44
6.40

6.46

6.15

5.90

5.65
5.48
5.40

Continuous

Periodic

Low

High

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
7.07
Org_ID
1
6.59
IAFreq X Org_ID
1
3.71
Between-subjects error
84
343.66

F
1.73
1.61
0.91

p-value
.192
.208
.343

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Org_ID = Means are adjusted based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007)
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00.
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TABLE 19: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – Gender Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

Likelihood of Earnings Management

7.50
7.29
7.00

6.50

Independent
6.23

6.00

Not Independent

6.01

5.50
5.34
5.00
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
22.64
Indep
1
14.24
*Gender
1
32.68
0.76
IAFreq X Indep
1
Between-subjects error

74

F

p-value
.019
.060
.005
.661

289.30

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Gender = Male (1) vs. Female (2).
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TABLE 20: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Gender Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.00
6.94
6.75

6.50

Independent

6.25

Not Independent
6.20

6.19
6.00

5.75

5.78
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
7.35
Indep
1
0.61
*Gender
1
0.00
6.97
IAFreq X Indep
1
Between-subjects error
82
346.09

F
1.74
0.14
0.00
1.65

p-value
.191
.705
.980
.202

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Gender = Male (1) vs. Female (2).
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TABLE 22: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –
Assurance Experience Covariate
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

Likelihood of Earnings Management

7.50
7.40
7.00

6.50

6.00

6.48

Independent

6.11
Not Independent

5.50

5.00

5.11
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
33.43
Indep
1
17.92
*AUD_EXP
1
0.38
0.04
IAFreq X Indep
1
Between-subjects error
73
302.59

F
8.07
4.32
0.09
0.01

p-value
.006
.041
.762
.923

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*AUD_EXP = Participants divided into low (high) assurance experience based on median of 12.50 years.
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TABLE 23: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) –
Assurance Experience Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.00
6.80

6.75

6.50

Independent

6.25

Not Independent
6.19

6.18

6.00

5.75

5.78
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
5.51
Indep
1
0.22
*AUD_EXP
1
0.43
5.65
IAFreq X Indep
1
Between-subjects error

82

F
1.35
0.05
0.11
1.36

p-value
.249
.818
.746
.247

335.83

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*AUD_EXP = Participants divided into low (high) assurance experience based on median of 12.50 years.
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TABLE 25: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –
Certification Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.50
7.39
7.00

6.50

6.00

Independent

6.46

Not Independent

6.06

5.50
5.15
5.00
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
33.52
Indep
1
16.07
*Certification
1
6.51
IAFreq X Indep
1
0.00
Between-subjects error
72
296.17

F
8.15
3.91
1.58
0.00

p-value
.006
.052
.213
.992

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Certification = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) a
certification.
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TABLE 26: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Certification Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.00
6.93
6.75

6.50

Independent

6.25

Not Independent

6.25

6.20

6.00

5.75

5.76
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
6.75
Indep
1
0.31
*Certification
1
2.17
IAFreq X Indep
1
8.04
Between-subjects error
83
343.93

F
1.63
0.08
0.52
1.94

p-value
.206
.784
.471
.167

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Certification = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) a
certification.
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TABLE 28: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –
External Audit Experience Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.50
7.38
7.00

6.50

6.00

Independent

6.50
6.15

Not Independent

5.50

5.00

5.07
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
34.879
Indep
1
18.840
*EA_EXP
1
1.398
IAFreq X Indep
1
0.19
Between-subjects error
74
301.58

F
8.56
4.62
0.34
0.05

p-value
.005
.035
.560
.826

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in accrual-based earnings
management on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*EA_EXP = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) external audit
experience (proxied by only a CPA license).
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TABLE 29: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) –
External Audit Experience Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.00
6.95
6.75

6.50

Independent

6.25

Not Independent
6.20

6.00

5.75

5.91
5.78
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
11.70
Indep
1
2.09
*EA_EXP
1
0.11
IAFreq X Indep
1
4.25
Between-subjects error
84
382.56

F
2.57
0.46
0.03
0.93

p-value
.113
.500
.875
.337

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*EA_EXP = Dichotomous measure of whether participants report that they have (1) or do not have (0) external audit
experience (proxied by only a CPA license).
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TABLE 30: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Overall) –
Organizational Identification (with Independence Covariate)
Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management
7.20
7.11

Likelihood of Earnings Management

6.90

6.60
6.41

Low

6.31
6.30
High
6.00

5.70
5.45
5.40
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
29.39
Org_ID
1
22.97
EM_Setting
1
1.10
*Indep
1
5.59
IAFreq X Org_ID
1
0.22
IAFreq X EM_Setting
1
4.55
Org_ID X EM_Setting
1
2.18
IAFreq X Org_ID X EM_Setting
1
4.46
Between-subjects error
157
639.71

F
7.21
5.64
0.27
1.37
0.05
1.12
0.54
1.09

p-value
.008
.019
.603
.243
.817
.292
.465
.297

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Org_ID = Dichotomous measure based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007)
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00.
EM_Setting = Participants were randomly assigned to either the accrual-based or real earnings management setting.
*Indep = Controls for whether participants were in the separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent)
assurance and consulting roles within the internal audit function.
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TABLE 31: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) –
Organizational Identification (with Independence Covariate)

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.80
7.68

7.50
7.20
6.90
6.60
6.30
6.00

6.36
6.10

5.70
5.40

5.43
Continuous

Periodic

Low

High

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
26.00
Org_ID
1
16.46
*Indep
1
18.34
IAFreq X Indep
1
1.74
Between-subjects error
73
283.30

F
6.70
4.24
4.73
0.45

p-value
.012
.043
.033
.506

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Org_ID = Dichotomous measure based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007)
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00.
*Indep = Controls for whether participants were in the separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent)
assurance and consulting roles within the internal audit function.
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TABLE 32: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) –
Organizational Identification (with Independence Covariate)

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

6.65

6.60
6.43

6.40

6.46

6.15
5.90
5.65
5.40

5.47
Continuous

Periodic
Low

High

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
7.40
Org_ID
1
6.68
*Indep
1
0.62
IAFreq X Org_ID
1
3.65
Between-subjects error
83
343.04

F
1.79
1.62
0.15
0.88

p-value
.185
.207
.699
.350

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in real earnings management
on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Org_ID = Dichotomous measure based on average responses to a modified version of the Bamber and Iyer (2007)
Organizational Identification (Org_ID) Scale and divided into low (high) Org_ID based on median score of 12.00.
*Indep = Controls for whether participants were in the separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent)
assurance and consulting roles within the internal audit function.
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TABLE 34: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – Industry Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management
7.50
7.41
7.00

6.50

6.00

Independent
6.25

6.10

Not Independent

5.50

5.00

5.10
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
29.866
Indep
1
23.269
*Industry
1
.270
IAFreq X Indep
1
.122
Between-subjects error
76
321.730

F
7.055
5.497
.064
.029

p-value
.010
.022
.801
.866

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Industry = Dummy Code that represents the industry that most closely represents participants’ employer.
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TABLE 35: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Industry Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.10
6.99

6.90
6.70
6.50

Independent
6.31

6.30

Not Independent

6.10
5.90
5.70

5.91
5.72
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
15.927
Indep
1
1.407
*Industry
1
1.133
IAFreq X Indep
1
4.424
Between-subjects error
87
393.182

F
3.524
.311
.251
.979

p-value
.064
.578
.618
.325

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Industry = Dummy Code that represents the industry that most closely represents participants’ employer.

116

TABLE 37: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based) – Title Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.50
7.44
7.00

6.50

6.00

Independent

6.54
6.11

Not Independent

5.50

5.00

5.01
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
38.970
Indep
1
19.549
*Title
1
5.559
IAFreq X Indep
1
.207
Between-subjects error
73
297.410

F
9.565
4.798
1.364
.051

p-value
.003
.032
.247
.822

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Title = Dummy Code that represents the position currently held by each participant.
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TABLE 38: Likelihood of Earnings Management (Real) – Title Covariate

Likelihood of Earnings Management

Panel A: Mean likelihood of earnings management

7.00
6.91
6.75

6.50

Independent

6.25

Not Independent

6.24

6.15
6.00

5.75

5.81
Continuous

Periodic

Panel B: ANOVA Results (Audit Frequency x Independence)
Df
SS
IAFreq
1
7.652
Indep
1
.587
*Title
1
3.376
IAFreq X Indep
1
5.546
Between-subjects error
83
342.723

F
1.853
.142
.818
1.343

p-value
.177
.707
.369
.250

Dependent variable = Auditor’s assessment of the likelihood a manager would engage in either accrual-based or real
earnings management (based on random assignment) on a Likert-type scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10(very likely)
IAFreq = Manipulated between-subjects as continuous (daily) vs. periodic (every three years) internal audits.
Indep = Manipulated between-subjects as separate (independent) vs. combined (not independent) assurance and
consulting roles within the internal audit function.
*Title = Dummy Code that represents the position currently held by each participant.
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VITA

Dereck D. Barr, CPA (TN – Inactive), CIA joined the PhD program in the Patterson
School of Accountancy in 2009. Prior to his doctoral studies, Dereck received both Bachelor and
Master of Accountancy degrees from the University of Mississippi in 2002 and 2004,
respectively. He then spent six years in internal audit positions at the FedEx World Headquarters
following a brief stint with Vitro America; both companies are domiciled in Memphis, TN. His
most significant auditing experience was spent leading complex entity audits for the international
audit groups.
Dereck’s primary teaching and research interests are in the field of auditing. He is most
interested in factors that affect auditor (internal and external) judgments and the strategic
interactions between auditors and managers. Currently, he is working on projects that
individually examine the effect of continuous auditing on internal auditor judgments, how multiaccount audit settings affect the auditor’s ability to anticipate and respond to the manager’s
possible tendencies toward financial misreporting, and the effect of professional skepticism on
auditor decision-making.
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EDUCATION
E. H. Patterson School of Accountancy, The University of Mississippi
Doctor of Philosophy in Accountancy (Psychology minor), May 2014
Master of Accountancy, August 2004
Bachelor of Accountancy (Music minor), August 2002

ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Research/Teaching Assistant, University of Mississippi – August 2009 – May 2014
Senior Internal Auditor, Federal Express Corporation – January 2004 – August 2009
Sarbanes Oxley Consultant, Vitro America – October – December 2005

PUBLICATION ACTIVITY



The Impact of Contrasts on Auditors’ Assessment of Fraud in a Multi-Account Setting (with
Kendall Bowlin) – under review at The Accounting Review
One Man’s Journey: William L. Campfield’s Contributions to the Accounting Profession,
New Accountant, Forthcoming

WORKING PAPERS



Dissertation: The Role of Independence in the Effectiveness of Continuous Auditing
Factors that Affect Firms’ Decisions to Correct Control Deficiencies Identified in PCAOB
Inspections (with Kendall Bowlin and Robin Jackson)

WORK IN PROGRESS






The Effect of Internal Audit Function Quality on Management’s Use of Accrual-Based
and Real Earnings Management (with Vicki Dickinson and Kendall Bowlin)
Trait-influenced Behaviors and Risk-based Decision Making (with Brian Goodson)
Auditing XBRL (with Kelly Williams)
The Effect of Continuous Auditing on Jurors’ Assessments of Auditor Independence

SCHOLARLY PRESENTATIONS
2014: The University of Mississippi; The University of Wisconsin – Madison; Rutgers, The
State University of New Jersey
2013: AAA Annual Meeting (Anaheim, CA); Audit Section Midyear Meeting (New Orleans,
LA); Accounting Doctoral Students Association (Anaheim, CA); AAA Diversity Section
(Atlanta, GA); AAA Rookie Recruiting & Research Camp (Miami, FL) – December 2013
2012: AAA Annual Meeting (Washington, DC); Audit Section Midyear Meeting
(Savannah, GA); Accounting Doctoral Students Association (Washington, DC);
Accounting, Behavior, and Organizations Research Conference (Atlanta, GA)
2011: AAA Annual Meeting (Denver, CO); AAA Southeast Regional Meeting
(Destin, FL)
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OTHER CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES







AAA Annual Meeting – 2009 – 2013
Auditing Section Midyear Meeting and Doctoral Consortium – 2012, 2013, 2014
Accounting, Behavior, and Organizations Doctoral Consortium – 2010, 2012
World Continuous Auditing Symposium – Rutgers Business School – 2011, 2012
PhD Project Accounting Doctoral Students Association Annual Meeting – 2009 – 2013
Southeast Regional Meeting – 2010

COURSES TAUGHT (AS INSTRUCTOR OF RECORD)
Principles of Accounting I & II (Fall 2010 – Spring 2013) – The University of Mississippi

PEER REVIEW AND PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
Ad Hoc Reviewer
 Research in Accounting Regulation
Research Summary Writer
 AAA Audit Section Research Summary Database Project, 2011
Conference Paper Reviewer
 AAA Annual Meeting
 AAA Accounting, Behavior and Organizations Research Conference
 AAA Audit Section Mid-Year Meeting
 AAA Southeast Region Meeting

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS






The Institute of Internal Auditors (Memphis Chapter)
Tennessee Society of Certified Public Accountants (Memphis Chapter)
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Beta Alpha Psi
Omicron Delta Kappa

FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, & AWARDS







AAA/Deloitte/J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium – Lake Tahoe, CA, 2011
AICPA Minority Doctoral Fellow, 2010 – 2014
KPMG Doctoral Fellow, 2009 – 2014
University of Mississippi Graduate School Dissertation Fellowship, 2013; 2014
University of Mississippi Summer Research Fellowship, 2013
AAA Diversity Section Doctoral Travel Grant, 2013
“A challenge only becomes and obstacle when you bow to it.”– Ray Davis
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